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ABSTRACT 
  Formalism has returned, displacing the flexible, functionalist 
separation-of-powers analysis that often characterized the Supreme 
Court’s separation-of-powers decisions during the Rehnquist Court. 
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board 
provides powerful evidence of this emerging trend. Moreover, a 
reliable majority of the Justices have strongly embraced formalism in 
other important separation-of-powers decisions as well. A new 
formalism now appears to govern the Court’s contemporary 
separation-of-powers jurisprudence—with the defenders of more 
flexible, functional approaches to separation-of-powers questions 
relegated to writing dissents. The Roberts Court, however, has failed 
to elucidate fully the precise scope and meaning of its new formalist 
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vision for separation-of-powers doctrine. Even so, if the Roberts 
Court’s decisions mean what they appear to say, serious constitutional 
questions exist about the constitutional validity of cooperative-
federalism programs in which states have primary responsibility for 
the administration of important federal labor, environmental, and 
healthcare programs. Simply put, the new formalism renders such 
programs open to serious constitutional attack on separation-of-
powers grounds because the president arguably lacks sufficient direct 
oversight and control of the state-government officers who administer 
and enforce federal law on a day-to-day basis. But the Supreme Court 
need not follow the logic of its more recent separation-of-powers 
decisions to this ultimate conclusion; plausible arguments exist to 
support the claim that cooperative-federalism programs do not violate 
separation-of-powers doctrine even under a demanding formalist 
analysis. Until the full implications of the Roberts Court’s embrace of 
the new formalism are known, legal scholars, federal judges, and 
administrative-law practitioners should consider carefully whether 
cooperative-federalism programs can successfully be reconciled with 
the imperatives of the unitary executive and its requirement of direct 
presidential control and oversight of the administration of federal law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court has vacillated between strictly enforcing 
separation-of-powers principles—often denominated formalism—and 
balancing the potential policy benefits of a novel governmental 
structure against derogation from the assignment of legislative, 
executive, and judicial tasks under the Constitution—often 
denominated functionalism.1 As Professor Martin Redish and his 
coauthor Elizabeth Cisar aptly note,  
[T]he [Rehnquist] Court . . . evinced something of a split personality, 
seemingly wavering from resort to judicial enforcement with a 
formalistic vengeance to use of a so-called “functional” approach 
that appear[ed] to be designed to do little more than rationalize 
incursions by one branch of the federal government into the domain 
of another.2  
 
 1. See Linda D. Jellum, “Which Is To Be Master,” the Judiciary or the Legislature? When 
Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 854–55, 860–62, 870–
78 (2009) (discussing formalism and functionalism and providing a comprehensive survey of the 
relevant legal literature); see also M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of 
Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1136–47 (2000) (discussing the common ground between 
formalism and functionalism and describing that common ground as incoherent and 
inadequate); John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 1939, 1950–62 (2011) (discussing formalism and functionalism and questioning the utility 
of the dichotomy in resolving arguments about administrative structure). 
 2. Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were To Govern”: The Need for 
Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 450 (1991) (footnote 
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The Roberts Court’s separation-of-powers decisions, however, reflect 
a strong, pronounced, and consistent turn toward formalism. 
This new formalism casts renewed doubt on the constitutionality 
of laws that vest the enforcement of federal statutes outside the 
executive branch of the federal government.3 Such systems include 
cooperative-federalism programs, in which state agencies take 
primary responsibility for the enforcement of federal laws,4 and 
federal administrative regimes that vest enforcement powers in 
private entities.5 As Dean Evan Caminker notes, “Congress 
frequently encourages states to become regulatory partners in federal 
programs, sometimes by threatening to preempt the existing 
regulations of non-participating states, and other times by rewarding 
participating states with substantial monetary subsidies.”6 
This Article focuses largely on cooperative-federalism schemes 
and the separation-of-powers problems they present. I pay particular 
attention to whether the delegation of administrative authority to 
state officers—who are accountable to governors, state legislatures, or 
a state’s electorate, rather than the president—can be reconciled with 
the Supreme Court’s emerging new formalism in separation-of-
 
omitted). Professors Redish and Cisar state that “[t]he Court has gone from one extreme to the 
other, with the assertion of what are at best tenuous distinctions.” Id. 
 3. See Harold J. Krent, Federal Power, Non-Federal Actors: The Ramifications of Free 
Enterprise Fund, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2427 (2011) (noting that the decision in Free 
Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010), “provides 
renewed reason to consider whether congressional delegations outside the federal government” 
present separation-of-powers problems). 
 4. See CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING 
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 43 (2003) 
(“Congress established a ‘cooperative federalism’ structure that makes EPA ultimately 
responsible for program delivery while reserving the primary front lines implementation role for 
willing and capable states.”); see also William L. Andreen, Delegated Federalism Versus 
Devolution: Some Insights from the History of Water Pollution Control, in PREEMPTION 
CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 257, 258 
(William W. Buzbee ed., 2009) (noting that the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006 
& Supp. IV 2010), is an example of cooperative federalism because the enforcement “structure 
is not just federal but also involves overlapping and intertwined federal and state roles”); 
Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 
MD. L. REV. 1141, 1174 (1995) (“The cooperative federalism model seeks to . . . establish[] 
national environmental standards while leaving their attainment to state authorities subject to 
federal oversight.”) 
 5. See Harold J. Krent, The Private Performing the Public: Delimiting Delegations to 
Private Parties, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 507, 507 (2011) (“Private parties discharge critical roles in 
the Obama Administration, as they have in administrations past.”). 
 6. Evan Caminker, The Unitary Executive and State Administration of Federal Law, 45 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 1075, 1075 (1997). 
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powers theory and practice. Some federal laws feature delegations of 
administrative authority to nongovernmental, private entities, such as 
professional associations and organizations, and, in some instances, 
even to private corporations.7 To be sure, delegations to 
nongovernmental entities are far less common, and generally are less 
important, than cooperative-federalism programs that use a 
federal/state government partnership model. Even so, they are no less 
susceptible to separation-of-powers objections under the Supreme 
Court’s emerging new formalism. For the most part, however, my 
argument focuses on the use of state governments to enforce federal 
law, rather than on delegations of administrative responsibilities to 
private entities.8 
Even when a state volunteers to enforce federal law—thus 
avoiding federalism pitfalls9—a separate, and entirely different, 
separation-of-powers question exists regarding the decision to vest 
executive authority over federal regulatory programs in the states. 
Article II of the Constitution provides that all of the executive powers 
 
 7. See Krent, supra note 3, at 2427, 2436–37 (describing delegations to various 
professional organizations and private corporations, including the National Academy of 
Sciences, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), and the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants); see also A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong 
Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN To Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE 
L.J. 17, 20, 34–35, 168–69 (2000) (discussing ICANN, a private corporation vested with the 
power to regulate Internet domain names).  
 8. To be clear, the federal government regularly contracts with private enterprises to 
provide essential goods and services; the potential separation-of-powers objection to 
delegations of administrative responsibilities to private, nongovernmental entities would not 
extend to this commonplace use of contracting to achieve various federal objectives. For 
example, when Lockheed Martin contracts with the Department of Defense to design and build 
military equipment for the U.S. military, it is not involved in the administration of federal law. 
Cf. Krent, supra note 5, at 518 (noting that “President Obama has continued his predecessors’ 
practice of outsourcing a multitude of tasks to the private sector,” including border security, 
modernization of the Coast Guard’s fleet, and the preparation of “proposed rules and 
respon[ses] to congressional inquiries”). But if Congress attempted to delegate to Lockheed 
Martin the power to establish combat regulations to govern the use of military forces in the 
field, a delegation of core executive power would exist—and, moreover, would present a serious 
constitutional question. See infra Parts II, IV; see also Krent, supra note 3, at 2427, 2438, 2454 
(“The question remains where to draw the line between impermissible and valid exercises of 
authority by private parties. Eliciting advice from private parties does not violate Article II, but 
directing private parties to set trade policy would contravene presidential power.”).    
 9. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 910–11 (1997) (stating that problems arise 
when Congress attempts to impose “responsibilities without the consent of the States”); New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) (identifying “a variety of methods, short of 
outright coercion, by which Congress may urge a State to adopt a legislative program with 
federal interests”). 
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“shall be vested in a President of the United States of America”10 and 
that the president “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.”11 Cooperative-federalism programs may offend separation-
of-powers principles by encroaching on the president’s duty to 
superintend the implementation of federal law.12 Legal scholarship 
has considered the potential costs and benefits of these schemes,13 but 
it has largely ignored the separation-of-powers issue. 
 
 10. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. For a comprehensive overview of the unitary-executive 
theory, see generally Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power To 
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994). 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 12. See Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997 
SUP. CT. REV. 199, 230–32 (“Given the President’s inability to exercise ‘meaningful control’ 
over state officials’ implementation decisions, the principle of executive unity would seem to 
invalidate all conventional joint federal-state programs.”); Caminker, supra note 6, at 1075–79 
(“Almost lost in this federalism debate is the fact that these congressional efforts to induce or 
coerce state administration of federal law implicate intriguing and difficult separation of powers 
principles as well.”); Krent, supra note 3, at 2425–38 (“[T]he congressional structure—in 
particular, the double layer of tenure insulation—undermined the Article II imperative that all 
exercises of significant executive authority be subject to strong supervision by the President.”); 
Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of 
Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 62 (1990) (“[B]y 
vesting responsibilities in officials independent of the President’s authority, Congress has 
attempted to restrict the Executive’s involvement in executing such laws . . . .”). 
 13. See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 
118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009) (positing that states may use their role as “servant[s]” to and 
“insider[s]” of the federal government to act as “rivals and challengers” in some instances—
what the authors call “uncooperative federalism” (emphasis omitted)); Abbe R. Gluck, 
Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in 
Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534 (2011) (arguing that the different roles played by 
states should impact how statutes are interpreted and understood from a federalism 
perspective); Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS. L.J. 557 (2000) 
(criticizing cooperative federalism as a means to reduce political transparency and 
accountability); Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698 
(2011) (describing how states can gain some control over federal power by adjusting 
enforcement levels and “pressing their own interpretations of federal law”); Neil S. Siegel, 
Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1629 (2006) 
(discussing how the anticommandeering rule can harm federalism and state autonomy by 
triggering preemption). Counterexamples exist, however, and some legal scholars have squarely 
addressed the separation-of-powers question. See Neil Kinkopf, Of Devolution, Privatization, 
and Globalization: Separation of Powers Limits on Congressional Authority To Assign Federal 
Power to Non-Federal Actors, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 331, 366–70, 377–81 (1998) (arguing that 
general separation-of-powers principles should apply when examining the assignment of federal 
power to nonfederal actors); Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for 
Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 711–19 (2001) (arguing that courts will have to 
confront the separation-of powers concerns that arise under the growing use of cooperative-
federalism regulatory programs).  
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In the immediate aftermath of the Printz v. United States14 
decision, a few legal scholars posited separation-of-powers-based 
limits on cooperative-federalism programs.15 Most legal scholarship, 
however, has focused on the normative and public-policy implications 
of such arrangements, rather than on their constitutionality—a point 
that has been taken more or less as a given.16 Thus far, the Supreme 
Court has not addressed the implications of a broad reading of Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion in Printz. And in the meantime, Congress 
has continued to create programs that rely not only on cooperative 
federalism, but also on the use of private entities to administer federal 
regulatory programs.17 This Article challenges the status quo and 
posits the existence of separation-of-powers-based limits on 
cooperative-federalism programs. 
The Roberts Court’s separation-of-powers decisions reflect a 
pronounced trend toward formalism.18 Formalists believe that a 
 
 14. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 15. See, e.g., Jay S. Bybee, Printz, The Unitary Executive, and the Fire in the Trash Can: Has 
Justice Scalia Picked the Court’s Pocket?, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 269, 286 (2001) (“The 
broadest implications of the separation-of-powers argument in Printz are for those creative 
arrangements in which Congress has committed the enforcement of federal law to non-
governmental (or at least non-federal and non-state) entities.”); Caminker, supra note 6, at 1076 
(“Almost lost in this federalism debate is the fact that these congressional efforts to induce or 
coerce state administration of federal law implicate intriguing and difficult separation of powers 
principles as well.”).  
 16. See, e.g., Andreen, supra note 4, at 259–65 (discussing the normative implications of 
cooperative-federalism programs); Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 13, at 1307 (“[This 
Article] begins to sketch a normative argument for why uncooperative federalism might be 
useful in a well-functioning federal system.”); Lemos, supra note 13, at 699–702, 739–44, 756 
(discussing the costs and benefits of state enforcement of federal law); Percival, supra note 4, at 
1173–74 (“This model is consistent with constitutional principles of federalism outlined in New 
York v. United States, [505 U.S. 144 (1992),] where the Court expressly approved Congress’s use 
of its spending power to encourage states to implement federal programs.”); David A. Super, 
Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1375, 1390–97 (2011) (examining concurrent legal 
decisionmaking by various actors and considering “which timing arrangements [for making legal 
decisions] would best serve social needs across the range of policy areas”). 
 17. See, e.g., Froomkin, supra note 7, at 34–35 (2000) (noting that ICANN is a private 
corporation that “has been making domain name policy under contract with the Department of 
Commerce”); Krent, supra note 5, at 508–09, 513–18 (providing examples of congressional 
delegations to nongovernmental entities and questioning the constitutional permissibility of 
such delegations); Krent, supra note 12, at 84–91 (examining congressional delegations to 
outside parties as potentially inconsistent with separation-of-powers doctrine). 
 18. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2601 (2011) (vacating a bankruptcy court’s final 
judgment because it had exercised judicial power that is granted only to “the judges of such 
courts [that] enjoy” Article III protection); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight 
Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147 (2010) (“Here the President cannot remove an officer who enjoys 
more than one level of good-cause protection, even if the President determines that the officer 
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reviewing court should establish clear lines separating legislative, 
executive, and judicial functions and enforce those lines to prohibit 
any novel power-sharing arrangements that reallocate and mismatch 
powers among the three branches.19 This trend represents a major 
jurisprudential shift in the Supreme Court’s approach to analyzing 
separation-of-powers questions. 
Significantly, this is not the Supreme Court’s first embrace of 
formalism in its separation-of-powers analysis. Many of the Burger 
Court’s landmark separation-of-powers decisions reflected and 
incorporated highly formalist reasoning.20 The Burger Court also 
strictly enforced the separation of powers based on fidelity to the 
Framers’ structural design of the federal government.21 
By contrast, the Rehnquist Court tended to utilize functionalist 
reasoning when deciding separation-of-powers questions. A 
functionalist approach considers what benefits might be associated 
with a novel reallocation of responsibilities among the branches and 
will sustain a reallocation of duties if (1) the arrangement conveys 
significant benefits and (2) the reallocation of functions does not 
 
is neglecting his duties or discharging them improperly. . . . This contravenes the President’s 
‘constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the laws.’” (quoting Morrison v. 
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988))); New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635, 2638 (2010) 
(holding that two NLRB members could not, alone, exercise the NLRB’s statutory authority 
because they would not satisfy the statute’s quorum requirement). For a discussion of these 
cases and the Supreme Court’s strong embrace of formalism in separation-of-powers analysis, 
see infra Part II.  
 19. For an overview of the concepts of formalism and functionalism, see generally Jellum, 
supra note 1, at 854–62, 870–78; Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., On the Danger of Wearing Two 
Hats: Mistretta and Morrison Revisited, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 475–84 (1997). 
 20. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (invalidating the Balanced Budget 
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037, also known as the 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, because it vested executive duties in an officer subject to 
congressional appointment and control); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957–59 (1983) 
(invalidating, on separation-of-powers grounds, the use of line-item-veto provisions that vested 
in Congress or some part of it the power to superintend the execution of laws); N. Pipeline 
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982) (invalidating portions of the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549), because they 
vested core Article III powers in non-Article III bankruptcy judges).  
 21. See, e.g., Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 721–28 (“The structure of the Constitution does not 
permit Congress to execute the laws.”); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944–52 (“The very structure of the 
Articles delegating and separating powers under Arts. I, II, and III exemplifies the concept of 
separation of powers . . . .”); N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 57–62, (maintaining that 
powers are distributed among the three branches according “to the constitutional structure 
established by the Framers”); see also Bernard Schwartz, Curiouser and Curiouser: The Supreme 
Court’s Separation of Powers Wonderland, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 587, 597–608 (1990) 
(describing and criticizing “the Burger Court’s increasingly formalistic approach to the 
separation of powers”). 
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“unduly” aggrandize one branch at the expense of another or 
otherwise encroach on a “core” function of a particular branch.22 
Cases from the Rehnquist Court that incorporated functionalism in 
their separation-of-powers analysis include Mistretta v. United States,23 
Morrison v. Olson,24 and Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. 
Schor.25 
The Roberts Court appears to be engaged in a broad revival of 
formalism in its separation-of-powers analysis; indeed, its decisions 
consistently reject balancing the costs and benefits of novel 
reallocations of power and instead favor articulating and enforcing 
bright-line rules.26 For example, in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. 
Accounting Oversight Board,27 Chief Justice Roberts explained that 
“[t]he Constitution requires that a President chosen by the entire 
Nation oversee the execution of the laws.”28 Moreover, the president 
“is not limited, as in Harry Truman’s lament, to ‘persuad[ing]’ his 
unelected subordinates ‘to do what they ought to do without 
persuasion.’”29 This is strikingly formalist language and reasoning. 
Furthermore, this new formalist turn in separation-of-powers law 
and theory seems to reflect a stronger embrace of the unitary-
executive theory. This theory posits that the president must have the 
ability to oversee personally the execution of federal law, regardless 
of whether Congress vested the execution of a particular law with an 
 
 22. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851–52, 856–57 (1986) 
(espousing a functionalist test in which “due regard must be given in each case to the unique 
aspects of the congressional plan at issue and its practical consequences in light of the larger 
concerns”); see also Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2625–26 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that a 
delegation of power should only constitute a violation if it “constitutes a significant 
encroachment” by one branch of the government onto another); Jellum, supra note 1, at 870–71, 
873, 877 (describing and discussing the functionalist concepts of core functions and 
encroachment or aggrandizement). 
 23. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 24. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 25. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
 26. See, e.g., Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2601 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[A]n Article III judge is 
required for all federal adjudications . . . .”); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight 
Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3154 (2010) (“[The dual for-cause removal] arrangement is contrary to 
Article II’s vesting of the executive power in the President. Without the ability to oversee the 
Board, or to attribute the Board’s failings to those whom he can oversee, the President is no 
longer the judge of the Board’s conduct.”). 
 27. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). 
 28. Id. at 3155–56. 
 29. Id. at 3157 (alteration in original) (quoting CLINTON ROSSITER, THE AMERICAN 
PRESIDENCY 154 (2d rev. ed. 1960)). 
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independent federal agency, with the states, or with a private entity.30 
As Professors Calabresi and Prakash observe, “Because the President 
alone has the constitutional power to execute federal law, it would 
seem to follow that, notwithstanding the text of any given statute, the 
President must be able to execute that statute, interpreting it and 
applying it to concrete circumstances.”31 Adherents of this theory of 
executive power believe that “the President alone possesses all of the 
executive power and that he therefore can direct, control, and 
supervise inferior officers or agencies who seek to exercise 
discretionary executive power.”32 
The unitary-executive theory, coupled with this new formalism, 
could require Congress to reconsider major aspects of environmental, 
labor, and healthcare regulation. Under the unitary-executive theory, 
all tasks associated with the execution of federal laws are subject to 
presidential superintendence, if not complete presidential control. 
Professor Steven Calabresi and his coauthor Kevin Rhodes strongly 
endorse this theory, arguing that “[t]he President could not possibly 
be said to have all of the executive power in order to be able to take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed if he could not tell his 
subordinates what to do.”33 The implications of this construction of 
presidential authority are quite significant; as Calabresi and Rhodes 
note, the construction “renders unconstitutional independent 
agencies and counsels to the extent that they exercise discretionary 
executive power.”34 
The unitary-executive theory, at least in its strongest iteration, 
would nullify all limits on presidential control of independent 
 
 30. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 10, at 593.  
 31. Id. at 595 (emphasis added); see also Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The 
Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1165–66 
(1992) (describing the “strong form” of the unitary-executive theory and positing the legality of 
direct presidential usurpation of duties delegated to another executive-branch entity, such as the 
Federal Trade Commission, or by parity of logic, the Federal Reserve Bank); Caminker, supra 
note 12, at 205 (noting that the unitary-executive theory “demands that the President oversee 
the execution of all federal law”); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Note, Hail to the Chief 
Administrator: The Framers and the President’s Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991, 992 
(1993) (arguing that “[w]henever an official is granted statutory discretion, the Constitution 
endows the President with the authority to control that discretion”). 
 32. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 31, at 1165 (footnote omitted). 
 33. Id. at 1207. 
 34. Id. at 1165–66 (footnote omitted). To be clear, the advocates of the unitary executive 
do not argue that the president may order a subordinate to refuse to perform a mandatory 
ministerial task. See id. at 1166 n.53 (“The unitary executive debate concerns only presidential 
control over discretionary exercise of executive power by subordinates.”). 
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agencies that exercise policymaking authority, such as the Federal 
Communications Commission or the Federal Reserve Bank of the 
United States.35 Delegations outside the executive branch would be 
even more objectionable; if a state or private entity undertakes 
primary responsibility for securing particular federal environmental, 
labor, or healthcare objectives, the president’s ability to directly 
supervise the execution of the law becomes at best attenuated, if not 
completely absent. For example, the president cannot fire a state 
employee or even directly manage that employee’s work. The same 
would be true of delegations of executive responsibility to 
nongovernmental private entities, such as professional associations or 
organizations, or to private corporations, at least insofar as such 
entities administer federal regulatory programs.36 Dean Harold Krent 
cogently argues that “the President would not be able to oversee” the 
exercise of such delegated authority; that “the President must be 
permitted the discretion to accept, reject, or modify the standards 
selected by private entities”; and that “[a]fter Free Enterprise Fund, 
such delegations may be permissible only if the government can 
exercise exacting review before [the standards established by a 
private regulator become effective].”37 
Accordingly, if the Vesting38 and Take Care39 Clauses of Article 
II require that the president enjoy a meaningful ability to direct the 
execution of federal laws,40 then federal laws that export these duties 
to state and private entities raise serious separation-of-powers 
problems. Federal courts have some relatively easy ways to avoid 
these implications. A federal court might, for example, characterize 
state enforcement of a state law enacted to comply with a federal 
statute as involving only state enforcement of state law.41 
Alternatively, cooperative-federalism schemes usually have a variety 
 
 35. See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 31, at 1166 (noting that under the strong form of 
the unitary-executive theory, the president “might have the direct power to supplant any 
discretionary executive action taken by a subordinate with which he disagrees, notwithstanding 
any statute that attempts to vest discretionary executive power only in the subordinate”). 
 36. See Krent, supra note 5 (describing and critiquing the delegation of administrative 
responsibilities to private, nongovernmental entities). 
 37. Krent, supra note 3, at 2439–40. 
 38. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 39. Id. art. II, § 3. 
 40. See id art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United 
States of America.”); id. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed . . . .”). 
 41. See infra Part IV.C. 
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of direct and indirect forms of federal oversight; a federal court could 
hold that these oversight mechanisms, even if imperfect, satisfy the 
requirements of the separation-of-powers doctrine. Examples of this 
oversight include the use of funding and grants to secure state 
compliance with federal enforcement priorities; the power to suspend 
a state’s primacy status with respect to enforcing federal law within its 
borders; and the ability, in some cases, to duplicate, by “overfiling,” 
state enforcement activities.42 
But all of these forms of indirect presidential control involve 
displacing rather than directing state enforcement activities. In 
addition, the existence of these forms of federal oversight tends to 
undercut rather severely the notion that states are simply enforcing 
state laws; in general, the federal government does not fund, audit, or 
have the ability to duplicate a state’s enforcement of its own state 
laws.43 Thus, if the Roberts Court really means what it says about the 
centrality of direct presidential oversight to the separation-of-powers 
doctrine, it should invalidate cooperative-federalism programs on the 
ground that they unconstitutionally delegate the enforcement of 
federal law outside the executive branch. 
In Part I, this Article explains the meaning and implications of 
formalism and functionalism. Part II makes the case for the 
emergence of a new formalism in the Supreme Court’s analysis of 
separation-of-powers questions. In particular, the majority opinions 
in Free Enterprise Fund, Stern v. Marshall,44 and New Process Steel, 
 
 42. See infra Part IV.A. 
 43. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State 
Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 816 (1998) 
(proposing a “functional theory of cooperative federalism” that nevertheless “maintains that 
state and local governments should have ‘autonomy’—that is, immunity from federal demands 
for regulatory services”). As one commentator notes, “The general notion that the United 
States might force a State to enforce its own law or regulations strikes a discordant cord under 
America’s doctrine of dual sovereignty.” Alfred R. Light, The Myth of the Everglades 
Settlement, 11 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 55, 60 n.37 (1998) (citing New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144, 188 (1992)). Moreover, the rule that the federal courts will not review a state court 
decision if that decision rests on independent and adequate state law grounds reflects and 
incorporates the more general principle that the federal government does not superintend the 
enforcement of state laws by state governments. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1037–42 
(1983) (noting the “Court’s refusal to decide cases where there is an adequate and independent 
state ground”); Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 558–59 (1940) (Hughes, C.J., 
dissenting) (“The fact that provisions of the state and federal constitutions may be similar or 
even identical does not justify us in disturbing a judgment of a state court which adequately rests 
upon its application of the provision of its own constitution.”). 
 44. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). 
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L.P. v. NLRB45 all incorporate and reflect strongly formalist 
reasoning. Part III examines the structure of several important 
cooperative-federalism programs and the integral role of states in 
implementing federal labor, environmental, and healthcare programs. 
Part IV considers the implications of the new formalism for 
cooperative-federalism programs and argues that serious separation-
of-powers questions exist regarding the limited role of presidential 
oversight of the administration of such programs. Part V discusses 
some rejoinders to these potential separation-of-powers objections to 
cooperative-federalism programs, including the notion that 
cooperative-federalism programs involve only state enforcement of 
state law and, alternatively, that federal oversight of these programs 
satisfies the constitutional imperative for presidential control. This 
Article concludes that the full scope of the Roberts Court’s formalist 
jurisprudence remains uncertain and posits that the precise meaning 
and implications of the new formalism are yet to be determined. 
I.  RECONSIDERING FORMALISM AND FUNCTIONALISM IN 
SEPARATION-OF-POWERS ANALYSIS: SOME DEFINITIONAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
Before considering the Roberts Court’s return to formalism, 
some definitional work is essential. Precisely what do formalism and 
functionalism mean? Moreover, are the categories even coherent as a 
means of framing and resolving separation-of-powers questions? 
Although legal scholars have raised serious concerns about the 
viability of the formalism/functionalism dichotomy,46 the distinction 
retains significant explanatory force. 
 
 45. New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635 (2010). 
 46. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. 
PA. L. REV. 603, 609 (2001); see also Jellum, supra note 1, at 878–79 (“Rigidly dividing 
separation of powers analysis into these two categories, formalism and functionalism, is 
imperfect.”); Magill, supra note 1, at 1132–38, 1148–49 (“[N]either of the dominant approaches 
provides a consistent account of the methodology applied or the outcome of the cases.”); 
Manning, supra note 1, at 1972 (“New thinking about the legitimacy of strongly purposive 
reasoning reveals difficulties with the approach that underlies both strands of modern 
separation of powers doctrine.”). Although I have adopted the nomenclature of formalism and 
functionalism, I fully recognize that some prominent legal scholars have questioned the utility of 
traditional separation-of-powers analysis and thinking in light of the modern reality of blended 
functions shared among the three branches of the federal government. See, e.g., EDWARD L. 
RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE MODERN STATE 12 
(2005) (proposing abandonment of the outdated concepts used to analyze the government and 
instead approaching the administrative government with an updated conceptual framework); 
Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 634 (2000) (opposing 
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Professor Elizabeth Magill notes that “[o]ne approach [to 
separation-of-powers analysis], often dubbed formalist, emphasizes 
that the Constitution divides governmental power into three 
categories and, with some explicit textual exceptions, assigns those 
powers to three different branches of government.”47 She adds that 
“[f]or the formalist, questions of horizontal governmental structure 
are to be resolved by reference to a fixed set of rules and not by 
reference to some purpose of those rules.”48 Formalism is a 
categorical approach that does not consider the potential utility of a 
novel administrative structure in determining that structure’s 
constitutionality. Accordingly, “[w]hen confronting an institutional 
arrangement, a formalist, following a rule-like approach, identifies 
the type of power exercised and asks whether it is exercised by the 
appropriate department in the appropriate way.”49 
Professor Linda Jellum notes that “[t]he formalist approach 
emphasizes the need to maintain three distinct branches of 
government based on function.”50 Formalists “assume[] that all 
exercises of power must fall into one of these categories and take[] no 
ostensible account of the practicalities of administration in arriving at 
this determination.”51 “Formalism is, thus, a textually literal approach 
that relies primarily on the vesting clauses to define categories of 
power—legislative, executive, and judicial—and to identify the owner 
of each power.”52 
 
“the export of the American system [of separation of powers as a model for constitutions of 
other countries] in favor of an approach based on the constitutional practice of . . . many other 
nations.”). 
 47. Magill, supra note 46, at 608. 
 48. Magill, supra note 1, at 1138; see also Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the 
Limits of Formalism, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 853, 857–58 (1990) (noting that a formalist approach to 
separation-of-powers analysis utilizes a process of categorization derived from the three vesting 
clauses of the Constitution, which do not permit open-ended balancing exercises to justify a 
reallocation of powers among the three branches); Redish & Cisar, supra note 2, at 454–55 
(noting that in a formalist analysis, “the Court’s rule in separation of powers cases should be 
limited to determining whether the challenged branch action falls within the definition of that 
branch’s constitutionally derived powers—executive, legislative, or judicial”—and enforcing 
these boundaries). 
 49. Magill, supra note 46, at 608–09; see also Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: A 
Formalistic Perspective on Why the Court Was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 343 (1989) (“A 
formalist decision uses a syllogistic, definitional approach to determining whether a particular 
exercise of power is legislative, executive, or judicial.”). 
 50. Jellum, supra note 1, at 854. 
 51. Liberman, supra note 49, at 343. 
 52. Jellum, supra note 1, at 861. 
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Finally, under formalism, “[o]verlap is permitted only when 
constitutionally prescribed.”53 Professor John Manning observes that 
“[f]ormalist theory presupposes that the constitutional separation of 
powers establishes readily ascertainable and enforceable rules of 
separation.”54 
The primary competing vision utilizes overt balancing: the 
functionalist asks whether a particular administrative structure 
undermines a “core” function of a particular branch and whether the 
benefits of a given administrative structure offset its separation-of-
powers cost.55 Professor Jellum observes that “[t]he functionalist 
approach emphasizes the need to maintain pragmatic flexibility to 
respond to modern government.”56 Professor Manning adds that 
“[f]unctionalists believe that the Constitution’s structural clauses 
ultimately supply few useful details of meaning.”57 Moreover, 
“functionalists view the Constitution as emphasizing the balance, and 
not the separation, of powers.”58 Under a functionalist approach, 
“overlap beyond the core functions is practically necessary and even 
desirable.”59 Professor Jellum adds that “[f]unctionalists’ core concern 
is that one branch not take away or be given too much 
constitutionally assigned power from another branch.”60 
Professor Magill, quoting Professor Thomas Merrill, emphasizes 
that “[w]here a formalist is committed to rule-based decisionmaking, 
a functionalist would resolve structural disputes ‘not in terms of fixed 
rules but rather in light of an evolving standard designed to advance 
 
 53. Id. at 860. 
 54. Manning, supra note 1, at 1958. But cf. Magill, supra note 46, at 649–54, 660 
(questioning whether it is possible reliably to define and categorize specific government tasks as 
legislative, executive, or judicial and suggesting that “[t]here are no clean answers . . . about the 
great questions—the appropriate division of policymaking between the Congress and the 
executive, or the proper role of the judiciary in a representative democracy”). 
 55. Magill, supra note 46, at 609; see also Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power and 
Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451, 488 (1979) (“[T]he flexible approach must be 
characterized by estimations of the balance in given circumstances between the President’s 
concerns and the countervailing interests of the other branches and of the people.”). As 
Professor Magill puts it, “[T]he key question is whether an institutional arrangement upsets the 
overall balance among those branches by permitting one of them to compromise the ‘core’ 
function of another.” Magill, supra note 46, at 609. 
 56. Jellum, supra note 1, at 854–55. 
 57. Manning, supra note 1, at 1950. 
 58. Id. at 1952. 
 59. Jellum, supra note 1, at 861. 
 60. Id. at 870. 
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the ultimate purposes of a system of separation of powers.’”61 Not 
surprisingly, when the Supreme Court utilizes a functionalist analysis, 
more often than not, the reallocation of powers survives 
constitutional review.62 When the Supreme Court relies on formalist 
analysis, however, the reverse holds true: the Supreme Court usually 
finds that the novel administrative structure at issue violates the 
separation of powers.63 
The Supreme Court has not definitively embraced either 
formalism or functionalism in a consistent and predictable fashion. 
Instead, the Court has “vacillate[d] back and forth between the two 
dominant approaches, relying on something resembling the formalist 
approach to invalidate certain arrangements—the line-item veto and 
legislative vetoes—and something similar to functionalism to validate 
other arrangements—the independent counsel statute, the exercise of 
adjudicatory authority by administrative agencies.”64 As Professor 
 
 61. Magill, supra note 1, at 1142 (quoting Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle 
of Separation of Powers, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 231). 
 62. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 378–79, 396 (1989) (upholding the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695–97 (1988) (upholding a 
statute creating an independent counsel, despite the fact that the president could not directly 
fire the officer); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 844–45 (1986) 
(holding that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission can adjudicate state-law 
counterclaims in reparations proceedings). Professor Magill notes, “As if to reaffirm that fear 
about the nature of a functionalist inquiry, opinions characterized as functionalist . . . have 
invariably sustained the challenged arrangement.” Magill, supra note 1, at 1145. 
 63. See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011) (holding that the bankruptcy 
court lacked the Article III authority to enter a final judgment on a counterclaim); Free Enter. 
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147 (2010) (holding that the good–
cause-removal provision protecting members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB), created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 
(codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.), when viewed in conjunction with 
a similar good-cause-removal protection insulating members of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission from presidential removal from office, violated separation-of-powers principles 
because the dual limitations on the president’s removal power operated to deprive the president 
of sufficient ability to oversee and supervise the PCAOB); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 
(1986) (holding that the powers vested in the comptroller general by Congress violated the 
separation of powers by giving Congress a direct role in the execution of the laws); INS v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956–57 (1983) (holding that a legislative-veto provision violated 
separation of powers by creating a loophole for legislation to bypass bicameralism and 
presentment to the president); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 
85–87 (1982) (holding that Congress may not transfer core judicial powers from Article III 
courts to a non-Article III court). 
 64. Magill, supra note 46, at 609–10; see also Jellum, supra note 1, at 870 (“Rather, the 
Court has oscillated between formalism and functionalism throughout its history.”). 
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Redish and Cisar note, “The Court has gone from one extreme to the 
other, with the assertion of what are at best tenuous distinctions.”65 
Some legal scholars suggest that the formalism/functionalism 
dichotomy is not particularly helpful in analyzing difficult separation-
of-powers issues. For example, Professor Magill argues that “[t]he 
debate over formalism and functionalism is a distraction, masking a 
robust consensus to which nearly all participants in the debate 
subscribe.”66 She posits that “matching the exercise of certain types of 
government authority with specific types of government 
decisionmakers” would constitute a better approach.67 In her view, “a 
reconstructed separation of powers doctrine must ask a different set 
of questions than it does now when it is seeking to match the exercise 
of classes of government authority with corresponding 
decisionmakers.”68 Although “achingly” familiar, existing separation-
of-powers doctrine and theory, which emphasize the distinct nature of 
legislative, executive, and judicial powers and duties, constitute “an 
unhelpful way to evaluate whether an institutional arrangement is 
constitutional.”69 
II.  THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE NEW FORMALISM 
In three separation-of-powers decisions from the 2009 and 2010 
Terms, the Supreme Court has eschewed functionalist reasoning in 
favor of formalist analysis of separation-of-powers questions. Free 
Enterprise Fund provides, by far, the clearest and strongest example 
of this jurisprudential shift. The two other cases, Stern and New 
Process Steel, also plainly reflect formalist reasoning. 
A. Free Enterprise Fund 
Free Enterprise Fund is the most important of the formalist 
trilogy of separation-of-powers decisions from the Roberts Court. In 
Free Enterprise Fund, the majority invalidated a two-tiered system of 
for-cause removal that insulated members of the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) from removal by the 
president.70 The PCAOB, a creation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
 
 65. Redish & Cisar, supra note 2, at 450. 
 66. Magill, supra note 1, at 1129. 
 67. Magill, supra note 46, at 650. 
 68. Id. at 660. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147 (2010). 
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2002,71 exercises the power to conduct investigations, initiate 
prosecutions, and write regulations necessary to implement the 
statute.72 Under that Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) was to appoint the PCAOB’s members, who could only be 
removed for good cause by the SEC.73 All parties to the Free 
Enterprise Fund litigation stipulated that the president’s power to 
remove a sitting commissioner of the SEC was limited to good cause 
as well.74 Thus, if the president objected to an administrative decision 
of the PCAOB and the SEC refused to act, he would have had to 
produce good-cause reasons to remove at least three SEC members 
and hope that their replacements would either successfully intervene 
with the PCAOB or, in the alternative, use good-cause grounds to 
advance the president’s agenda by removing the uncooperative 
members of the PCAOB. 
The Supreme Court invalidated the good-cause-removal 
protection for members of the PCAOB,75 excising it from the statute 
and holding that this two-tiered system of good-cause protection 
denied the president sufficient oversight power over the exercise of 
core executive functions, “contrary to Article II’s vesting of the 
executive power in the President.”76 In doing so, the Court rejected 
the lower appellate court’s functionalist analysis in the case. The D.C. 
Circuit had sustained the two-tiered limitation on the theory that 
 
 71. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.); id. § 101(e)(6), 116 Stat. at 750 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 7211(e)(6) (2006)). 
 72. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7213(a), 7215 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 
 73. Id. § 7211(e)(6) (2006).  
 74. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3148–49 (“The parties agree that the Commissioners 
cannot themselves be removed by the President except under the . . . standard of ‘inefficiency, 
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office’ . . . .” (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 
U.S. 602, 621 (1935))). 
 75. Id. at 3147; see also 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(6) (providing that PCAOB members may be 
removed only “for good cause shown”); id. § 7217(d)(3) (noting that good cause in 15 U.S.C. 
§ 7211(e)(6) includes willful violation of “any provision of th[e] Act, the rules of the Board, or 
the securities laws”; willful abuse of authority; or “without reasonable justification or excuse, 
[failure] to enforce compliance with any such provision or rule, or any professional standard by 
any registered public accounting firm or any associated person thereof”). Although the SEC’s 
organic act, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2006 & Supp. IV 
2010), does not directly state that SEC commissioners may only be removed for good cause, the 
Free Enterprise Fund majority assumed that the commissioners enjoy protection from removal 
from office absent a good-cause basis for the removal action, see supra note 74. 
 76. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3147; see also id. at 3151 (“We hold that the dual for-
cause limitations on the removal of Board members contravene the Constitution’s separation of 
powers.”). 
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most of the PCAOB’s powers were subject to oversight by the SEC 
and, thus, that the PCAOB did not really exercise any core executive 
functions.77 Chief Justice Roberts disagreed with this reasoning, 
explaining that the two-tiered system of job protection resulted in “a 
Board that is not accountable to the President, and a President who is 
not responsible for the Board.”78 
Under the PCAOB’s structure, “[n]either the President, nor 
anyone directly responsible to him, nor even an officer whose conduct 
he may review only for good cause, has full control over the Board.”79 
Chief Justice Roberts explained, 
  That arrangement is contrary to Article II’s vesting of the 
executive power in the President. Without the ability to oversee the 
Board, or to attribute the Board’s failings to those whom he can 
oversee, the President is no longer the judge of the Board’s conduct. 
He is not the one who decides whether Board members are abusing 
their offices or neglecting their duties. He can neither ensure that 
the laws are faithfully executed, nor be held responsible for a Board 
member’s breach of faith. This violates the basic principle that the 
President “cannot delegate ultimate responsibility or the active 
obligation to supervise that goes with it,” because Article II “makes 
a single President responsible for the actions of the Executive 
Branch.”80 
This language strongly suggests that the president must have the 
ability not merely to fire persons with responsibility for executing 
federal laws, but also to supervise those with responsibility for 
enforcing federal law on a day-to-day basis. 
Even though formalism, as noted earlier, utilizes a process of 
categorization and line drawing, rather than open-ended balancing, to 
analyze novel administrative structures,81 practical concerns still 
animated the Chief Justice’s analysis. Notably, Chief Justice Roberts 
argued that presidential oversight materially advances an important 
interest in securing the political accountability of administrative 
actions. He explained that “[t]he diffusion of power carries with it a 
 
 77. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 681–83 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). 
 78. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3153. 
 79. Id. at 3154. 
 80. Id. (quoting Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 712–13 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in the 
judgment)). 
 81. See supra notes 48–54 and accompanying text. 
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diffusion of accountability.”82 According to Chief Justice Roberts, a 
“clear and effective chain of command” makes it possible for the 
public to hold government accountable.83 Hence, “[b]y granting the 
Board executive power without the Executive’s oversight, this Act 
subvert[ed] the President’s ability to ensure that the laws are 
faithfully executed—as well as the public’s ability to pass judgment on 
his efforts.”84 Accordingly, “[t]he Act’s restrictions [were] 
incompatible with the Constitution’s separation of powers.”85 
Free Enterprise Fund contains broad language that appears to 
require the president to have not only the ability to replace those 
enforcing federal law, but also the ability to supervise and monitor 
their actions. “The Constitution requires that a President chosen by 
the entire Nation oversee the execution of the laws.”86 And, according 
to the Court, the power to destroy the Board is not the same thing as 
the power to supervise the Board.87 At a minimum, the Constitution 
requires that the president enjoy “the authority to remove those who 
assist him in carrying out his duties” because “[w]ithout such power, 
the President could not be held fully accountable for discharging his 
own responsibilities; the buck would stop somewhere else.”88 In sum, 
“[i]n its pursuit of a ‘workable government,’ Congress cannot reduce 
the Chief Magistrate to a cajoler-in-chief.”89 
The implications of this analysis are quite staggering. If the 
separation of powers requires direct presidential supervision of the 
execution of federal law, cooperative-federalism programs stand on 
very shaky legal ground. Delegations to nongovernmental entities 
also appear utterly inconsistent with Chief Justice Roberts’s vision of 
 
 82. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3155. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 3155–56; see also id. at 3164 (“The Constitution that makes the President 
accountable to the people for executing the laws also gives him the power to do so.”). 
 87. See id. at 3159 (“The Commission cannot wield a free hand to supervise individual 
members if it must destroy the Board in order to fix it. . . . But the Act nowhere gives the 
Commission effective power to start, stop, or alter individual Board investigations, executive 
activities typically carried out by officials within the Executive Branch.”). 
 88. Id. at 3164. 
 89. Id. at 3157. Indeed, if the ability to remove personnel who enforce federal law is 
essential to securing the president’s authority under Article II, the options for finding a 
statutory cure seem at best remote. See Caminker, supra note 12, at 229–30 (“If one believes 
both that Article II requires meaningful presidential control and that meaningful control 
requires a removal power, then it follows that [an act’s] Article II violation can be remedied 
only through invalidation of the commandeering provisions.”). 
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an accountable president with the ability to directly superintend the 
execution of federal law.90 
B. Stern v. Marshall 
In Stern, the Supreme Court invalidated provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Act91 that permitted bankruptcy judges to adjudicate 
certain common-law claims,92 constrained only by very circumscribed 
review in the Article III courts.93 The Bankruptcy Act permitted 
bankruptcy courts to “hear and enter final judgments in ‘core 
proceedings’ in a bankruptcy case.”94 But this statutory authorization 
did not resolve the constitutional question: May a non-Article III 
tribunal adjudicate common-law claims when the specific common-
law claims are integral to resolution of a pending bankruptcy case?95 
Chief Justice Roberts answered this question with a resounding 
“no.”96 Writing for the 5–4 majority, Chief Justice Roberts explained 
that “[a]lthough [the Court] conclude[d] that § 157(b)(2)(C) permits 
the Bankruptcy Court to enter final judgment on [the petitioner’s 
common-law] counterclaim, Article III of the Constitution does 
not.”97 
The majority’s analysis was unabashedly formalist in tone and 
approach. First, Chief Justice Roberts characterized adjudication of a 
common-law claim as a judicial function that falls within “the judicial 
Power” of the Article III federal courts, a power that “shall be vested 
 
 90. See Krent, supra note 3, at 2438 (“Viewed through an Article II lens, congressional 
determinations to delegate significant authority outside the President's control are 
suspect. . . . [T]he key here is that the Supreme Court’s recent decision makes it far more likely 
that congressional delegations of authority to private parties will elicit closer scrutiny by the 
Supreme Court should such challenges arise in the future.”). Professor Krent argues that “Free 
Enterprise Fund may well have sounded the death knell for delegations of significant authority 
to private parties.” Id.; cf. Caminker, supra note 12, at 225–26 (noting that the unitary-executive 
theory, if broadly applied, “could call into question, at the least, the constitutionality of both 
‘independent’ agencies and various delegations of authority to private individuals and groups”). 
 91. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 
Stat. 333, 340 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 7, 11, 28, and 45 U.S.C.); id. 
§ 157(b)(2)(C), 98 Stat. at 340. 
 92. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608 (2011). 
 93. Id. at 2603–04. In “core proceedings,” a district court can review the bankruptcy court’s 
findings of fact only “under traditional appellate standards,” rather than de novo. Id. at 2604.  
 94. Id. at 2601–02. 
 95. See id. at 2600–01, 2608–09, 2619–20 (considering the constitutionality of non-Article 
III court adjudication of common-law claims). 
 96. Id. at 2608. 
 97. Id. 
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in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress 
may from time to time ordain and establish.”98 According to the 
majority, “Article III could neither serve its purpose in the system of 
checks and balances nor preserve the integrity of judicial 
decisionmaking if the other branches of the Federal Government 
could confer the Government’s ‘judicial Power’ on entities outside 
Article III.”99 
Absent from the Stern majority’s constitutional analysis was any 
consideration of the potential benefits of permitting a bankruptcy 
court to resolve a core proceeding involving a common-law claim. 
Factors related to efficiency, cost, and the like were simply irrelevant 
to the Court’s separation-of-powers analysis.100 Moreover, 
functionalist counterarguments got short shrift because “[i]t goes 
without saying that ‘the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, 
convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, 
standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.’”101 
By contrast, the dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Breyer 
and joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, analyzed the 
case through a functionalist lens and found that the benefits 
associated with the administrative structure more than justified any 
inherent risk to the integrity of Article III courts.102 Urging a 
“pragmatic approach to the constitutional question,” Justice Breyer 
argued that a reviewing court should “determine whether, in the 
particular instance, the challenged delegation of adjudicatory 
authority posed a genuine and serious threat that one branch of 
Government sought to aggrandize its own constitutionally delegated 
authority by encroaching upon a field of authority that the 
Constitution assigns exclusively to another branch.”103 Moreover, 
Justice Breyer repeatedly invoked the need for pragmatism in 
 
 98. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 99. Id. at 2609. 
 100. See id. at 2619 (rejecting the claim that the Court’s ruling would “create significant 
delays and impose additional costs on the bankruptcy process”). 
 101. Id. (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)). 
 102. See id. at 2630 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[A] constitutionally required game of 
jurisdictional ping-pong between courts would lead to inefficiency, increased cost, delay, and 
needless additional suffering among those faced with bankruptcy.”). 
 103. Id. at 2624. 
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separation-of-powers analysis104 and decried undue formalism or 
formalistic analysis.105  
The dissent proposed an open-ended balancing test to analyze 
separation-of-powers questions involving novel reallocations of core 
Article III duties.106 This approach stood in stark contrast to the 
majority’s eschewal of balancing in favor of a simple categorical 
approach.107 For Justice Breyer, however, the controlling 
consideration was the disutility of “a constitutionally required game 
of jurisdictional ping-pong between courts [that] would lead to 
inefficiency, increased cost, delay, and needless additional suffering 
among those faced with bankruptcy.”108 
If one reads Stern in tandem with Free Enterprise Fund, it 
becomes reasonably clear that a majority of the Roberts Court has 
embraced formalism and has done so with gusto. The question of 
methodological approach no longer remains open—formalism is in 
ascendancy. The only remaining questions to be decided are (1) the 
strength of the commitment that the five-Justice conservative bloc has 
to formalism and (2) the willingness of the conservative majority to 
follow formalism to its logical conclusions, even when doing so will 
upset existing administrative structures. 
 
 104. See, e.g., id. (“In [two previous] cases the Court took a more pragmatic approach to the 
constitutional question.”); id. (“The Court pointed out that the right in question was created by 
a federal statute, it ‘represent[s] a pragmatic solution to the difficult problem of spreading 
[certain] costs . . . .’” (alterations in original) (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. 
Co., 473 U.S. 568, 590 (1985)) (internal quotation mark omitted)); id. at 2625–26 (“This case 
law, as applied in [Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985),] 
and Schor, requires us to determine pragmatically whether a congressional delegation of 
adjudicatory authority to a non-Article III judge violates the separation-of-powers principles 
inherent in Article III.”). 
 105. See, e.g., id. at 2625 (advocating the avoidance of “formalistic and unbending rules” 
(quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986))); id. at 2626 
(criticizing the majority for “apply[ing] more formal standards” and “disregard[ing] recent, 
controlling precedent”). 
 106. See id. at 2626 (“[W]e must determine through an examination of certain relevant 
factors whether that delegation constitutes a significant encroachment by the Legislative or 
Executive Branches of Government upon the realm of authority that Article III reserves for 
exercise by the Judicial Branch of Government.”). 
 107. See id. at 2600–01, 2609–10, 2615, 2619–20 (majority opinion) (considering only whether 
non-Article III bankruptcy judges were deciding common-law claims that would otherwise fall 
squarely within the judicial power of the United States, rather than engaging in a cost/benefit 
analysis of permitting non-Article III judges to decide such cases in the context of a bankruptcy 
proceeding); cf. id. at 2625–26 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (applying a multifactor balancing test to 
analyze adjudication of common-law claims by bankruptcy judges).  
 108. Id. at 2630 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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C. New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB 
In New Process Steel, the Roberts Court rejected an effort to 
authorize two members of the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) to act for the agency during an extended period in which the 
board had only two members, pursuant to a prior delegation made by 
a three-member NLRB.109 Just before the NLRB lost its quorum of 
three voting members, the agency had voted to delegate the power to 
decide future cases to the two remaining board members, provided 
that both voting members agreed to the disposition of the case.110 
Under this procedure, a 2 to 0 vote of the two remaining NLRB 
members would constitute the decision of the agency in pending 
administrative adjudications.111 
The NLRB defended the delegation to a two-member panel as 
one born out of necessity. Absent a delegation of decisional authority 
to a panel composed of the two remaining NLRB members, the 
agency would simply have ceased to function, and adjudications 
would have come to a complete halt until the president and the 
Senate resolved an impasse over the confirmation of new NLRB 
members.112 Because of this delegation, the two-member Board 
instead managed to decide almost six hundred cases during the 
twenty-seven months in which it lacked a third member.113 
Disallowing this delegation nullified hundreds of NLRB 
adjudications. Despite the consequences of the decision, the New 
Process Steel majority was emphatic that an administrative agency 
could not delegate its authority to anything less than a quorum.114 To 
hold otherwise would have permitted the agency to redefine the 
 
 109. New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635, 2639–40 (2010). 
 110. Id. at 2638–39. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See id. at 2644–45 (discussing and rejecting the NLRB’s necessity defense for delegating 
the NLRB’s adjudicative powers to the two remaining board members). 
 113. Id. at 2639. 
 114. See id. at 2645 (“Congress’ decision to require that the Board’s full power be delegated 
to no fewer than three members, and to provide for a Board quorum of three, must be given 
practical effect rather than swept aside in the face of admittedly difficult circumstances. 
[National Labor Relations Act § 3(b), 29 U.S.C. § 153(b)(2006),] as it currently exists, does not 
authorize the Board to create a tail that would not only wag the dog, but would continue to wag 
after the dog died.”). The NLRB’s organic act defines a quorum of the five-member board as 
three members. 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (2006). 
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scope of its authority, something that only Congress may do.115 The 
Court expressly found “that the Board quorum requirement and the 
three-member delegation clause should not be read as easily 
surmounted technical obstacles of little to no import.”116 
The majority opinion by Justice Stevens embraced a formalist 
analysis, notwithstanding the fact that strict enforcement of the three-
member-quorum requirement could mean that the NLRB would be 
unable to conduct adjudications for very long periods of time. The 
practical implications of the decision were of little import to the New 
Process Steel majority. Instead, the core issue involved fealty to 
Congress’s institutional design for the NLRB.117 Embracing the 
complete incapacity of the NLRB for twenty-seven months required a 
very strong commitment not only to separation-of-powers doctrine, 
but also to the nondelegation doctrine.118 
D. Lujan and Printz: Earlier Examples of Formalism and the 
Unitary-Executive Theory 
As noted, a specific subset of formalism in separation-of-powers 
analysis involves the unitary-executive theory. As expounded by its 
chief proponent on the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia, the unitary-
executive theory requires that the president, and not state or 
nongovernmental entities, execute federal laws.119 In Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife,120 Justice Scalia invoked the separation of 
powers to justify his rejection of the concept of generic citizen 
standing conferred by Congress, a concept that would have 
empowered any would-be private attorney general to seek redress for 
so-called “procedural injur[ies]” in the federal courts.121 
 
 115. See New Process Steel, 130 S. Ct. at 2641 (“[I]f Congress had intended to authorize two 
members alone to act for the Board on an ongoing basis, it could have said so in straightforward 
language.”). 
 116. Id. at 2644. 
 117. See supra note 114. 
 118. See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Reconsidering the Nondelegation Doctrine: 
Universal Service, the Power To Tax, and the Ratification Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 239, 241–45, 
260–68 (2005) (discussing the nondelegation doctrine, its origins, and its functions). 
 119. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1991) (explaining that the “Chief 
Executive’s most important constitutional duty” is to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 120. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1991). 
 121. See id. at 571 (“The Court of Appeals found that respondents had standing . . . because 
they had suffered a ‘procedural injury.’” (quoting Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117, 
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To permit such a cause of action would have made the federal 
judiciary, in conjunction with private litigants, the president’s auditor; 
private litigants, in tandem with federal courts, would have exercised 
a general warrant to superintend the president’s enforcement of 
particular laws.122 Such an arrangement, Justice Scalia claimed, could 
not be squared with the president’s “faithful execution” powers.123 
Using similar reasoning, Justice Scalia invoked the unitary-
executive concept in Printz to prohibit Congress from delegating to 
state executive officers mandatory duties to enforce federal laws.124 
Such “commandeering” of state executive officers would have had an 
impermissible effect on “the separation and equilibration of powers 
between the three branches of the Federal Government itself.”125 
State officers—who are not accountable to the president—may 
not enforce federal law on a mandatory basis because of the unitary 
nature of the federal executive power. As Justice Scalia explained, 
“[U]nity would be shattered, and the power of the President would be 
subject to reduction, if Congress could act as effectively without the 
President as with him, by simply requiring state officers to execute its 
laws.”126 The anticommandeering principle accordingly constitutes an 
iteration and application of the unitary-executive theory of the 
presidency as much as an application of federalism principles.127 
Oddly, however, Justice Scalia indicated in a footnote that the 
problem of presidential control over the execution of federal laws is 
not implicated when a state government volunteers to perform a 
particular federal task.128 He conceded, “The dissent is correct that 
 
121 (8th Cir. 1990))); id. at 576–78 (rejecting the possibility that the respondents had suffered a 
“procedural injury” as a rationale for establishing Article III standing). 
 122. See id. at 576–77 (noting that “[v]indicating the public interest (including the public 
interest in Government observance of the Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress 
and the Chief Executive,” not of the federal courts and the general public, and arguing that “to 
permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts” and private litigants the duty to 
oversee execution of federal laws would violate the separation of powers by encroaching on a 
core executive-branch duty). 
 123. See id. at 577 (explaining that permitting generic citizen standing “would enable the 
courts . . . ‘to assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and co-equal 
department’” and noting that the Supreme Court has “always rejected that vision” of the courts 
(quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 489 (1923))). 
 124. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922–23 (1997). 
 125. Id. at 922. 
 126. Id. at 923. 
 127. See Caminker, supra note 12, at 205 (noting that under the unitary-executive theory, 
Article II “demands that the President oversee the execution of all federal law”). 
 128. Printz, 521 U.S. at 923 n.12. 
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control by the unitary Federal Executive is also sacrificed when States 
voluntarily administer federal programs, but the condition of 
voluntary state participation significantly reduces the ability of 
Congress to use this device as a means of reducing the power of the 
Presidency.”129 This is nonsensical as a matter of separation of powers.  
Regardless of whether the transfer of the authority over the 
execution of federal law to state officials takes place on a voluntary or 
involuntary basis, the net diminution of the president’s ability to 
oversee the administration of federal law remains exactly the same. 
As Dean Caminker notes, “Arguably, the requirement of presidential 
supervision should run to all forms of state administration of federal 
programs, even when the state voluntarily enacts state regulations 
designed specifically to serve federal objectives or satisfy federal 
standards.”130 Moreover, “[g]iven the President’s inability to exercise 
‘meaningful control’ over state officials’ implementation decisions, 
the principle of executive unity would seem to invalidate all 
conventional joint federal-state programs.”131 
Congress is quite capable of establishing incentives that virtually 
ensure that most state governments will volunteer to execute federal 
programs by adopting state laws incorporating the federal statute’s 
means and ends.132 If presidential control over all aspects of the day-
to-day execution of federal law is essential to the separation of 
powers, cooperative-federalism schemes rest on decidedly shaky 
constitutional ground. 
E. Seeing the Forest in the Trees: The Emerging New Formalism in 
Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence 
Since the 1970s, Congress has made frequent use of cooperative-
federalism programs, under which states are given the option of 
adopting and enforcing standards at least as demanding as the federal 
standards. Accepting these responsibilities constitutes a state’s 
agreement to be a “plan” state with “primacy” over enforcement of 
 
 129. Id. (citation omitted). 
 130. Caminker, supra note 12, at 230–31. 
 131. Id. at 231. 
 132. But see Annie Gowen, A Small-Government ‘Revolution’ in Kansas, WASH. POST, Dec. 
22, 2011, at A1 (noting that Governor Sam Brownback “rejected a $31.5 million federal grant 
for a new health-insurance exchange because he oppose[d] President Obama’s health-care 
law”). 
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these standards.133 If a particular state declines to adopt and enforce a 
law that incorporates the terms of the federal statute, the federal 
government will enforce the federal law directly within that particular 
jurisdiction.134 The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act)135 
provides a prominent example of a statute under which a plan state 
may take primary responsibility for protecting worker safety within 
its jurisdiction.136 Many federal environmental laws also follow this 
cooperative-federalism model; the Clean Air Act137 and the Clean 
Water Act (CWA)138 are two examples.139 
If, under the logic of Free Enterprise Fund, a two-tiered for-cause 
limitation on removal power within a federal agency violates the 
separation of powers,140 how can a cooperative-federalism scheme, in 
which primary responsibility for enforcing federal mandates falls on 
state officers, pass constitutional muster? When a state enforces a 
federal regulatory program, the president has absolutely no power or 
authority to control or direct, much less remove, a state officer 
 
 133. See Gluck, supra note 13, at 551–52 (explaining that cooperative federalism has become 
more in vogue over the past forty years because of the increased competency of state agencies 
and because “each federal program that gives money and implementation authority to the states 
makes those states more reliable, and relied-upon, partners with the federal government”); 
Jason Scott Johnston, On the Market for Ecosystem Control, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 129, 158–59 & 
n.57 (2002) (discussing “the great late twentieth century American Environmental movement” 
as an example of cooperative federalism and explaining that “‘cooperative federalism’ in 
environmental and resource regulation . . . originated . . . during the 1920’s to 
extend . . . principles of scientific management to private and state-owned forests . . . .”). But cf. 
Gluck, supra note 13, at 552 (“[A]ctually, cooperative federalism existed well before the 
1960s.”). As it happens, dating back to the 1920s, federal forest-control programs involved joint 
federal/state regulatory efforts. Johnston, supra note 133, at 159 n.57. That said, however, 
massive growth in the visibility and importance of cooperative-federalism regulatory programs 
took place in the 1960s and 1970s. Greve, supra note 13, at 577. For a succinct history of 
cooperative-federalism programs, see id. at 576–78. 
 134. See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 96–97, 101–03 (1992) 
(describing in some detail how the federal government will directly enforce federal standards if 
a state elects not to assume such responsibilities by seeking and obtaining “plan state” status 
under the OSH Act); Percival, supra note 4, at 1174 (noting that under most major federal 
environmental cooperative-federalism laws “[i]n states that choose not to apply for program 
delegation, the federal programs are operated and enforced by federal authorities”). 
 135. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1592 (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).  
 136. See infra notes 155–59 and accompanying text. 
 137. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7642 (2006 & Supp. III 2009)). 
 138. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 
816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)). 
 139. See infra Part III. 
 140. See supra notes 75–90 and accompanying text. 
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enforcing the federal program. As Dean Caminker notes, “Unless 
these state officials are subject to presidential supervision, Congress 
violates Article II by cutting the President out of the execution 
loop.”141 From this vantage point, “principles of separation of powers, 
in addition to principles of federalism, govern the validity of state 
administration of federal law.”142 
It is true, of course, that the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) could suspend a plan state’s certification and undertake direct 
responsibility for enforcing federal law,143 but the power to suspend 
the state agency from enforcing federal law is not really the same 
thing as the power to direct its day-to-day operations. Similarly, the 
power to suspend a state’s primacy status does not involve the power 
to remove and replace an incompetent or corrupt state officer who 
executes a federal environmental, labor, or healthcare law. If, as Free 
Enterprise Fund holds,144 more direct forms of presidential oversight 
and control are essential to effectuating the imperatives of Article II’s 
Vesting and Take Care Clauses, state enforcement of federal law 
presents a serious separation-of-powers problem. In fact, such 
programs appear to be unconstitutional. 
Professor Roderick Hills suggests that “one can regard systems 
of cooperative federalism as akin to the regime installed by the 
Articles of Confederation: Congress enacts general policies, and state 
and local governments carry them out.”145 The problem with this 
analogy, however, is glaringly obvious: no federal executive existed 
under the Articles of Confederation.146 Article II, by way of contrast, 
 
 141. Caminker, supra note 6, at 1077. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See infra notes 155–70, 197–221 and accompanying text.  
 144. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3164 
(2010) (“The Constitution that makes the President accountable to the people for executing the 
laws also gives him the power to do so. That power includes, as a general matter, the authority 
to remove those who assist him in carrying out his duties. Without such power, the President 
could not be held fully accountable for discharging his own responsibilities . . . .”). 
 145. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism in Constitutional Context, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 181, 185 (1998). 
 146. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX (failing to create or empower a 
national executive authority); Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 
CORNELL L. REV. 1021, 1028 (2006); see also Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The 
Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 277 (2001) (noting that the 
Continental Congress undertook executive duties, such as foreign affairs, in light of the absence 
of a national executive under the Articles of Confederation); John C. Yoo, The Continuation of 
Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of the War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 
218 (1996) (“State governments provided working examples of a separate executive branch, 
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establishes a unitary executive, vests the complete executive power in 
the office of the president,147 and requires the president to “take care 
that the Laws be faithfully executed.”148 
A model that exports the administration of federal law outside 
the executive branch arguably departs too far from the Framers’ 
design. Nevertheless, “non-federal implementation of federal law 
persists despite such absence of a constitutional framework, simply 
because of its practical advantages.”149 Practical advantages, however, 
are relevant only to a functionalist separation-of-powers analysis, not 
to the more categorical approach of formalism.150 
Moreover, as Professor Peter Strauss cogently argues, only the 
president brings a truly national perspective to bear when 
administering federal laws, and only the president can serve as an 
effective institutional counterweight to Congress.151 In a cooperative-
federalism scheme, local interests inevitably will skew the 
implementation and enforcement of federal law to favor local 
interests.152 No national standard will apply in fact, even if such 
standards exist in theory. 
This disunity occurs by design and intention and has the effect of 
greatly enhancing Congress’s de facto power over execution of 
federal law at the expense of the president and the executive branch. 
Congress is much better positioned than the president to dictate 
 
which the Articles of Confederation lacked.”). In fact, the national government established 
under the Articles of Confederation also lacked federal courts. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal 
Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1643 (1997) (“The Articles of 
Confederation lacked an effective supremacy clause, executive, or judiciary, and Congress 
lacked adequate power to raise revenue or to control the states in foreign relations.”). 
 147. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of 
the United States of America.”). 
 148. Id. art. II, § 3. 
 149. Hills, supra note 145, at 185. 
 150. See supra notes 46–65, 70–128 and accompanying text. 
 151. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and 
the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 596–97, 649–50, 662–64, 668–69 (1984) (“[O]ne must 
remain able to characterize the President as the unitary, politically accountable head of all law-
administration, sufficiently potent in his own relationships with those who actually perform it to 
serve as an effective counter to a feared Congress.”). 
 152. See, e.g., Dina ElBoghdady, FDA Faulted over State Inspections, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 
2011, at A2 (noting the problems with the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) increasing 
reliance on state-government agencies to inspect food-packaging and food-processing facilities 
and reporting on a “common problem” involving state agencies’ “inability to identify violations” 
of federal food-safety regulations); see also Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 13, at 1258–59, 
1265–70, 1289–91 (observing that states often intentionally and blatantly ignore federal 
standards when state officials oppose federal policies). 
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outcomes to fifty-one disparate administrative entities, most of which 
rely heavily on federal funding. This situation presents precisely the 
conditions that lead Professor Strauss, a pragmatic and principled 
functionalist, to insist on meaningful presidential control over all 
federal administrative agencies.153 As he states the proposition, “Only 
the President can supply these services.”154 
To be sure, a less principled functionalist than Professor Strauss 
would not be unduly troubled by these issues. There are, after all, 
meaningful forms of federal control, such as suspension of plan-state 
status for serial failures to enforce federal law, and the benefits of 
cooperative federalism are potentially quite significant. From a 
formalist perspective, however, the efficiency, convenience, and 
utility of cooperative-federalism enforcement schemes should be 
entirely irrelevant to their constitutional status. And from a principled 
functionalist perspective, very good, perhaps even compelling, 
reasons undergird the imperative of presidential control of the 
execution of federal law. 
To be very clear, I am not saying that I have reached a firm 
conclusion that after Free Enterprise Fund cooperative-federalism 
schemes are unconstitutional on separation-of-powers grounds. I am 
saying instead that these creative arrangements of shared 
responsibility for the enforcement of federal laws require 
reconsideration in light of the formalist principles articulated in Free 
Enterprise Fund. I would also assert, whatever the ultimate outcome 
of the analysis, that a rule that requires some measure of reasonably 
direct presidential removal power places a strain on any enforcement 
scheme that vests the execution of federal laws in the hands of 
officers who serve entirely outside the federal government. 
III.  COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM IN ACTION: THREE EXAMPLES 
To analyze properly the constitutional status of cooperative 
federalism post-Free Enterprise Fund, a working knowledge of actual 
cooperative-federalism programs is useful, perhaps even essential. 
 
 153. See Strauss, supra note 151, at 663 (“The power to balance competing goals—and the 
concomitant power to influence at least to some degree the agencies’ exercise of discretion—can 
only be the President’s; leaving the balancing functions in the agencies would create 
multiheaded government, government with neither the capacity to come to a definitive 
resolution nor the ability to see that any resolution is honored in all agencies to which it may 
apply.”). 
 154. Id.  
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This Part provides three brief sketches of current cooperative-
federalism programs and outlines some design elements that are 
common to many such programs. 
A. The OSH Act of 1970 and the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration 
State-plan provisions have been integral to the work of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) since the 
agency’s inception.155 John H. Stender, former assistant secretary of 
labor for OSHA, stated that Congress would not have enacted the 
OSH Act had the bill not included state-plan provisions.156 Under 
these provisions, states have the ability to develop state standards 
that preempt the federal OSHA standards.157 First, a state must 
submit to the secretary of labor a proposal to assume responsibility 
for the enforcement and development of occupational safety and 
health standards.158 The secretary must then approve the plan if, 
under his judgment, it meets eight criteria under the OSH Act 
designed to ensure that the state regulation is “at least as effective as” 
its federal counterpart.159 
A state plan must provide satisfactory assurances that the state 
agency will have the legal authority and personnel to administer and 
enforce the standards and that the state will “devote adequate funds 
to the administration and enforcement of such standards.”160 To 
ensure sufficient oversight by the secretary, the state plan must 
require employers in the state to submit reports to the secretary, just 
as they would if the state plan were not in effect.161 In addition, the 
state plan must provide for the state occupational safety and health 
agency to make reports to the secretary “in such form and containing 
such information, as the Secretary shall from time to time require.”162 
Any state regulation of occupational safety and health that the 
 
 155. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 18, 84 Stat. 1592, 
1608 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 667 (2006)). 
 156. John H. Stender, An OSHA Perspective and Prospective, 26 LAB. L.J. 71, 73 (1975). 
 157. 29 U.S.C. § 667(b) (2006). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. § 667(c). 
 160. Id. § 667(c)(4)–(5). 
 161. Id. § 667(c)(7). 
 162. Id. § 667(c)(8). 
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secretary has not approved is preempted if there is a federal standard 
in effect.163 
Even if the secretary approves the state plan, he retains the right 
to exercise authority “with respect to comparable standards 
promulgated under section 655 of [title 29]” until, based on the actual 
operations under the state plan, he determines that the state plan 
meets the standards described in the preceding paragraph.164 The 
secretary cannot make this determination until at least three years 
after his initial approval of the state plan.165 Twenty-one states and 
Puerto Rico have OSHA-approved state plans covering private- and 
public-sector employees.166 Four states and the Virgin Islands have 
approved plans covering only state- and local-government 
employees.167 
The OSH Act requires the secretary continuously to evaluate the 
administration and enforcement of the state plan based on the state-
agency reports and the secretary’s own inspections.168 If, during the 
continuing evaluation, the secretary finds, after due notice and 
hearing, that the state is failing to “comply substantially” with any 
part of the state plan, he must notify the state agency of his 
withdrawal of approval of the plan, at which point the plan will cease 
to be in effect.169 The secretary’s withdrawal of approval—or rejection 
in the first instance—of a state plan is subject to review by the local 
federal court of appeals, if the state petitions the court for such 
review.170 
B. The Clean Water Act and the EPA 
Professor Robert Percival notes that “[t]he predominant 
approach to environmental federalism currently employed by federal 
 
 163. See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98–99 (1992) (“[W]e hold 
that nonapproved state regulation of occupational safety and health issues for which a federal 
standard is in effect is impliedly preempted as in conflict with the full purposes and objectives of 
the OSH Act.” (citation omitted)). 
 164. 29 U.S.C. § 667(e); see also id. § 655 (providing for promulgation of national standards). 
 165. Id. § 667(e). 
 166. State Occupational Safety and Health Plans, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH 
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/osp/index.html (last visited Jan. 31, 
2012). 
 167. Id. 
 168. 29 U.S.C. § 667(f). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. § 667(g). 
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environmental statutes is the ‘cooperative federalism’ model.”171 He 
adds, “The principal federal pollution control statutes make federal 
agencies responsible for establishing national environmental 
standards that state authorities then may qualify to administer and 
enforce.”172 Other commentators note that “[t]he states have made 
ample use of the offer, and 75 percent of the major federal 
environmental programs are now administered by the states.”173 
For example, under the CWA, the federal government is the 
default administrator of the industrial discharge-permitting program 
known as the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES).174 The EPA may delegate its enforcement power to a state 
if the proposed state program gives the state the power to issue 
permits in compliance with the federal standards.175 
The EPA administrator retains the power to withdraw 
administration and enforcement authority from a state if the 
administrator finds that the state is not administering the approved 
state program in accordance with the federal NPDES.176 If the EPA 
administrator makes this determination after a public hearing, she 
must notify the state and allow the state a reasonable amount of 
time—up to ninety days—to take appropriate corrective action.177 
When a state subsequently fails to take such action, the administrator 
must withdraw approval of the state program, notify the state, and 
provide a public explanation in writing for the withdrawal.178 The 
administrator also has the option of taking enforcement action 
against a person who violates a permit issued by a state under an 
approved permit program by ordering compliance or bringing a civil 
action.179 
 
 171. Percival, supra note 4, at 1174. For a historical overview of federal environmental 
programs, see generally id. at 1146–65. 
 172. Id. at 1174; see also id. at 1143–45 (discussing the architecture and mechanics of 
cooperative federalism in the context of environmental protection). 
 173. Markus G. Puder & Michel J. Paque, Tremors in the Cooperative Environmental 
Federalism Arena: What Happens When a State Wants To Assume Only Portions of a Primacy 
Program or Return a Primacy Program?—The Underground Injection Control Program Under 
the Safe Drinking Water Act as a Case Study, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 71, 72 (2005). 
 174. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2006). 
 175. Id. § 1342(b). 
 176. Id. § 1342(c)(1). 
 177. Id. § 1342(c)(3). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. § 1319(a)(1); see also id. § 1342(i) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
limit the authority of the Administrator to take action pursuant to section 1319 of this title.”). 
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If the administrator finds that “violations . . . are so widespread” 
that they appear to be the result of a state’s failed enforcement, then 
the administrator must provide notice to the state.180 If the 
enforcement failures continue for more than thirty days after this 
notification, the administrator must enforce the permit conditions or 
limitations until the state satisfies the administrator that it will 
enforce the conditions or limitations itself.181 
C. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Health and 
Human Services, and the States 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)182 
provides a timely example of delegation of federal administrative 
power to the states. The ACA is a significant and controversial piece 
of healthcare-reform legislation that was signed into law in 2010.183 It 
contains provisions for an individual mandate,184 guaranteed health 
insurance regardless of most preexisting conditions,185 and the 
establishment of state health-insurance exchanges.186 
Perhaps the most troublesome of the provisions from a 
separation-of-powers perspective is the health-insurance-exchange 
 
 180. Id. § 1319(a)(2). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
 183. See Bryan J. Leitch, Where Law Meets Politics: Freedom of Contract, Federalism, and 
the Fight over Health Care, 27 J.L. & POL. 177 (2011) (detailing the constitutional challenges to 
the ACA and the political values underlying them); Brendan S. Maher, The Benefits of Opt-In 
Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1733, 1733–34 (2011) (noting that “[f]ew national debates have 
rivaled the intensity of those regarding the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act” and 
positing that “[t]he constitutional dispute is part of a larger argument that is perhaps America’s 
oldest: what is the proper role of the federal government?”); Ruth Mason, Federalism and the 
Taxing Power, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 979 (2011) (“More controversially, as part of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Congress recently inserted into the tax law a 
provision that has come to be known as the ‘individual mandate.’ This provision imposes a 
penalty on certain people who fail to buy private medical insurance.”); John Copeland Nagle, 
Saxe’s Aphorism, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1505, 1519–25 (2011) (reviewing JOHN F. MANNING 
& MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION (2010)) (noting the 
“controversy surrounding the congressional enactment of the ACA and the debate about the 
role of the administrative agencies responsible for implementing the Act” and discussing the 
main substantive provisions of the ACA, which involve a national plan for universal healthcare 
coverage and access). 
 184. ACA § 1501(a), 124 Stat. at 242–44 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18091). 
 185. Id. § 1101, 124 Stat. at 141–43 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18001). 
 186. Id. §§ 1321–1333, 10104(l)–(q), 124 Stat. at 186–208, 902–06 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 18041–18054). 
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section. An insurance exchange is a competitive marketplace for 
health insurance that allows individuals and small businesses to 
compare insurance options based on price, quality, and other 
variables.187 Each state has the ability to establish an exchange if it 
adopts the ACA standards or if it passes a state law implementing the 
federal standards.188 If a particular state does not establish a health-
insurance exchange, the secretary is required to establish and operate 
an exchange within the state.189 If the state chooses to establish an 
exchange, the exchange must be either (1) a governmental agency, 
meaning a state executive-branch agency or an independent public 
agency, or (2) a state-established nonprofit corporate entity.190 The 
ACA’s implementing regulations provide that “[s]tates should 
consider the costs and benefits of utilizing the accountability structure 
within an existing agency versus the need to establish a governing 
body for an independent agency.”191 Moreover, the regulations 
provide that “[n]on-profit entities may be able to operate without 
some of the restrictions that can limit the flexibility of governmental 
agencies.”192 
Regardless of the type of administrative entity established as the 
exchange, the management structure must be accountable for the 
performance and oversight of the exchange.193 Oversight of a private 
nonprofit corporate entity would be particularly difficult; even state 
control of such an entity could prove attenuated. Moreover, control 
and oversight becomes even more challenging if a state elects to 
establish multiple exchanges within its borders to cover different 
geographic areas of the state.194 
If a state later decides that it no longer wants to operate an 
exchange, it may voluntarily elect to have the federal government 
 
 187. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of Exchanges and 
Qualified Health Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,866, (July 15, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 
155–56). 
 188. Id. at 41,867. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 41,870. HHS announced in late 2011 that it would delegate the specific design of 
health-insurance plans to the states, thereby “giv[ing] states broad latitude to define the 
minimum benefits that many health insurance policies will be required to offer under the 2010 
health-care law.” N.C. Aizenman, States Will Have Flexibility in Defining Required Health 
Coverage, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2011, at A5. 
 191. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,870. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See id. at 41,870–71 (explaining how a series of regional exchanges would work).  
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establish and operate an exchange within the state.195 The state must 
notify the federal government of its intention to cease operation of 
the state exchange at least twelve months prior to ceasing operation, 
in order to give the federal government time to establish its 
exchange.196 This could mean, in practice, that a federally mandated 
exchange program could be inoperable for up to twelve months if a 
state fails to administer the exchange properly and a federal 
intervention proves necessary. 
D. Common Oversight Provisions and Problems in Cooperative-
Federalism Programs 
A state’s commitment to actually enforcing federal law is often 
lackluster. “At least twelve states have enacted legislation either 
forbidding their programs from promulgating standards that are 
tougher than federal minimum requirements or imposing additional 
procedures that must be satisfied before such requirements become 
effective.”197 States also undermine the efficacy of the CWA “through 
weaker environmental standards, lax implementation, and lethargic 
enforcement.”198 In turn, “[t]he crude tools available for enforcing 
such standards, for example, a withdrawal of federal funds or a 
federal takeover of state environmental programs, have added even 
more aggravation to the federal-state maelstrom.”199 As Professor Bill 
Andreen argues, “It seems as if many states would prefer not to 
vigorously enforce or implement even the basic requirements of the 
[CWA].”200 
In other words, the formal promises made in the state 
implementation plan (SIP), and in agreements put forward to secure 
conditional-funding grants are not always kept.201 Resource 
limitations make the EPA’s task of enforcing state promises very 
difficult, if not impossible.202 Moreover, the EPA lacks both the ability 
 
 195. Id. at 41,872. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Andreen, supra note 4, at 260. 
 198. Id. at 261. 
 199. Percival, supra note 4, at 1144–45. 
 200. Andreen, supra note 4, at 276. 
 201. Percival, supra note 4, at 1144–45. 
 202. Stephen C. Robertson, Note, State Permitting: United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc. 
and Federal Overfiling Under the Clean Water Act, 23 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 
593, 606 (1999); cf. ElBoghdady, supra note 152 (noting that resource constraints have led the 
FDA increasingly to rely on state inspections of food-industry plants). 
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to take over the enforcement of federal environmental laws directly, 
even if it were inclined to rescind a state’s primacy status, and 
sufficient resources to routinely audit a state environmental agency’s 
performance. In consequence, “[f]ederal environmental officials have 
had great difficulty ensuring that states meet minimum federal 
standards.”203 State intransigence is accordingly difficult to address 
effectively. 
On paper, the oversight provisions that govern state 
administration of the OSH Act, the CWA, and the ACA appear to 
create strong and effective federal superintendence over the state 
administration of these programs. In theory, “[c]ooperative 
federalism bridges the federal and state spaces” by enabling states “to 
gain the lead responsibility or primacy for day-to-day program 
implementation and enforcement through a transfer process known 
as delegation, authorization, and approval.”204 In practice, however, 
primary oversight mechanisms—such as formal SIPs that require 
regular reporting, subject states to random audits, and establish 
conditions for funding of states’ enforcement activities—do not result 
in meaningful supervision of state agencies on a day-to-day basis.205 
Moreover, state regulators are well aware that federal agencies simply 
could not replace them because federal entities lack the staff, 
resources, and even the experience necessary to operate major 
regulatory programs on a day-to-day basis.206 
The federal government uses three main mechanisms to rein in 
state resistance and to overcome the obstacles to effective 
implementation of regulatory programs: “vetoing” particular state-
agency decisions, withdrawing a state’s primacy status, and overfiling 
in the context of a state enforcement proceeding. Unfortunately, all 
three of these devices have major shortcomings and, in general, fail to 
ensure that states reliably serve as faithful agents of the federal 
government. 
 
 203. Percival, supra note 4, at 1144. 
 204. Puder & Paque, supra note 173, at 71–72 (footnote omitted).  
 205. See, e.g., RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 4, at 98–101 (discussing various 
EPA oversight, compliance, and enforcement activities).  
 206. See ElBoghdady, supra note 152 (reporting that the FDA has failed to adequately 
monitor state inspection and enforcement of federal food-safety regulations because the agency 
lacks the resources necessary to audit state compliance effectively). For example, the FDA has 
failed to audit state inspection programs for such lackluster reasons as a dearth of “trained 
auditors” and something as basic as a lack of “travel funds.” Id. Even in cases identifying 
recurring problems, the difficulties “were not always addressed,” and the FDA took corrective 
action “in only four of the 10 states where systemic problems were [found].” Id. 
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The first potential oversight tool is the ability to second-guess 
specific state decisions that implement federal statutes. In the context 
of the CWA, for example, 
[i]n addition to setting uniform effluent standards, EPA is given veto 
power over state-issued permits, the power in extreme instances to 
withdraw state permitting authority, the power to review and 
disapprove state water-quality standards, concurrent enforcement 
authority, and the power to shape state programs through the 
provision of federal financial assistance and the promulgation of 
EPA’s program regulations.207 
The second major oversight mechanism is the federal 
government’s power to withdraw a state’s primacy status. 
Unfortunately, this mechanism is not credible because the potential 
costs to the federal government are too large. Federal agencies simply 
do not revoke state authority to administer federal programs in 
practice, no matter how lackluster or poor a state agency’s 
performance. Taking over a state’s enforcement effort would require 
a significant expenditure of resources. Moreover, suspension requires 
prior notice to both the state and the public, so it often takes a 
significant amount of time to implement.208 These delays are only 
worsened by a state agency’s decision to seek judicial review of a 
suspension of its primacy status. As Professor Markus Puder and 
environmental-policy expert Michel Paque observe, “In light of the 
high thresholds for withdrawal and the significant resources and costs 
involved with direct implementation,” a federal agency “usually 
resorts to ‘golden reign’ sanctions, negotiations of new deadlines, or 
overfilings, rather than revocation of a state program.”209 
 
 207. Andreen, supra note 4, at 259 (footnotes omitted). 
 208. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 309(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(2) (2006) (requiring notice 
of ninety days before suspending a state’s primacy status under the Act); Clean Air Act 
§ 113(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(2) (2006) (requiring a thirty-day waiting period and public 
notice before suspension); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 3006(e), 42 U.S.C. § 
6926(e) (2006) (requiring the EPA to assume responsibility for enforcing the statute if a state 
defaults on its obligations “within a reasonable time,” which the statute defines as ninety days); 
see also Ellen R. Zahren, Comment, Overfiling Under Federalism: Federalism Nipping at State 
Heels To Protect the Environment, 49 EMORY L.J. 373, 381 (2000) (“The biggest sanction in all 
of the Acts is withdrawal of a state’s delegation and implementation of a federal program.”). 
 209. Puder & Paque, supra note 173, at 87 (footnotes omitted); see also RECHTSCHAFFEN & 
MARKELL, supra note 4, at 106–07 (discussing alternatives to termination of state primacy 
status). Another commentator reported in 1999 that “the EPA ha[d] never revoked a state 
program.” Robertson,supra note 202, at 606. 
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In fact, when a state did voluntarily offer to turn over 
responsibility for administration of just a portion of a major federal 
environmental program—the Underground Injection Control (UIC) 
Program—the EPA reacted with abject horror and “negotiated a last-
minute deal with the Illinois EPA to abort the return process.”210 
Massachusetts successfully returned delegated UIC authority to the 
EPA in 2003.211 This, however, is the exception that proves the rule. 
As Steven Robertson argues, “Given that the states perform the vast 
majority of site inspections, the practical reality of the EPA’s taking 
over an entire state’s inspection program is ‘more theoretical than 
real’ . . . .”212 
A third mechanism of oversight known as overfiling involves 
duplicating a state agency’s actions in a particular enforcement 
proceeding. Robertson explains that “[i]n rare circumstances, the 
EPA will use its authority to prosecute a polluter even though the 
state in which the polluter is situated has already initiated 
prosecution. This action is called an ‘overfiling.’”213 Ellen Zahren 
adds, “Overfiling occurs when the EPA either steps in to fix, change, 
undo, or add to what a state already has done or takes action after a 
state fails to act.”214 
Overfiling, however, requires the EPA to find that a state has 
failed to take “timely and appropriate action” and that a state 
agency’s enforcement effort has been “clearly inadequate.”215 Thus, 
the EPA will not overfile simply because it disagrees with a state 
agency’s general approach to a particular case; the state agency’s 
action must constitute a gross dereliction of duty, not mere negligence 
or ineffectiveness. Also, overfiling does not involve any power over or 
direct supervision of a state agency implementing federal law. 
Instead, “overfiling is an action taken against a regulated entity, not 
the state itself.”216 
 
 210. Puder & Paque, supra note 173, at 89–90. 
 211. Id. at 90–91. 
 212. Robertson, supra note 202, at 606 (footnote omitted) (quoting David R. Hodas, 
Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd 
When Enforcement Authority Is Shared by the United States, the States, and Their Citizens?, 54 
MD. L. REV. 1552, 1582–83 (1995)); see also Zahren, supra note 208, at 373–86 (describing and 
discussing the process of overfiling). 
 213. Robertson, supra note 202, at 600. 
 214. Zahren, supra note 208, at 373. 
 215. Memorandum from A. James Barnes, Deputy Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to 
Reg’l Adm’rs, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency 1–2 (May 19, 1986).  
 216. Zahren, supra note 208, at 416. 
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Overfiling represents a highly imperfect form of federal 
supervision for three main reasons. First, “[s]elected prosecution of 
notable offenders is more likely than a federal takeover of an entire 
state program, but even such selected targeting is rare.”217 Second, an 
agency “must give the state and the violator adequate notice, an 
action that has ‘the practical effect of [providing] more state control 
over enforcement actions.’”218 Third, and finally, even in the rare 
instances when a federal agency overfiles a state agency with primacy 
status, the regulated entity or the overfiled state agency usually may 
seek federal court review and, accordingly, a federal judge ultimately 
will decide whether a state agency’s failure to act satisfies the 
statutory and regulatory criteria for overfiling.219 
In sum, “the threat of withdrawal is almost completely 
unrealistic, creates too much tension, and might discourage some 
states from adopting a program at all.”220 At the same time, 
“[s]anctions and overfiling are the only ‘sticks’ given to the EPA by 
the statutes.”221 Other indirect forms of supervision, such as the 
conditional funding of state agencies administering federal law, 
regular reporting requirements, random audits, and the like also 
provide relatively attenuated forms of federal oversight and control.222 
In consequence, cooperative-federalism programs essentially transfer 
broad and effectively unsupervised responsibility for the 
administration of federal law to state agencies; whether by design or 
by default, Congress has not established an administrative structure 
that provides effective and meaningful oversight powers to the 
federal entities that ostensibly supervise state agencies enforcing 
federal law. 
 
 217. Robertson, supra note 202, at 606. 
 218. Zahren, supra note 208, at 416 (alteration in original) (quoting Hubert H. Humphrey 
III & LeRoy C. Paddock, The Federal and State Roles in Environmental Enforcement: A 
Proposal for a More Effective and More Efficient Relationship, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 7, 15 
(1990)). 
 219. See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769, 791–95 (E.D. Va. 1997) 
(granting the EPA authority over the defendant because Virginia’s sanctions were not 
comparable to those under the CWA); see also Robertson, supra note 202, at 610–14 (discussing 
the holding of United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769 (E.D. Va. 1997)). 
 220. Zahren, supra note 208, at 418. 
 221. Id. 
 222. See RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 4, at 13–21, 91–124; Zahren, supra note 
208, at 418. 
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IV.  RECONSIDERING COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 
If one takes seriously the importance of constitutional 
architecture, then the asserted practical benefits of cooperative 
federalism should not outweigh and overbear the negative 
consequences that cooperative federalism entails: damage to 
presidential control over the execution of federal law, the loss of 
accountability of the federal government to the citizenry, and the 
fracturing of federal law. Instead, “the centrality of the separation of 
powers concept to American political theory should be recognized, 
and . . . the [Supreme] Court’s enforcement of that concept needs to 
become considerably more vigorous than it [was under the Rehnquist 
Court].”223 
This Part returns to consideration of the constitutional text and 
its application to cooperative-federalism programs. In the first 
Section, I consider the explicit provisions that seem, on their face, to 
vest executive authority in a sole executive. In the next two Sections, I 
discuss the ways in which cooperative-federalism schemes threaten 
the government accountability and the uniformity of enforcement 
that would otherwise be achieved by a unitary executive. 
A. The Constitutional Imperative of Presidential Oversight of the 
Execution of Federal Law 
As discussed at the beginning of this Article, the constitutional 
text mandates that a single, unitary executive officer will oversee the 
implementation of federal law.224 Professor Strauss observes that “[a]ll 
will agree that the Constitution creates a unitary chief executive 
officer, the President, at the head of the government Congress defines 
 
 223. Redish & Cisar, supra note 2, at 452. 
 224. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of 
the United States of America.”); id. art. II, § 3 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.”). This language plainly 
indicates that the executive power must be vested in a single, national officer—the president—
and that the president must enjoy the power to oversee personally the execution of federal laws. 
The Opinions Clause, id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1, lends further textual support to the argument that the 
president must be able to directly supervise the enforcement of federal law, see id. art. II, § 2, 
cl. 1 (“The President . . . may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of 
the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective 
Offices . . . .”). For a discussion of the meaning and importance of the Opinions Clause, see infra 
notes 235–42 and accompanying text. 
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to do the work its statutes detail.”225 Thus, “[w]hatever arrangements 
are made, one must remain able to characterize the President as the 
unitary, politically accountable head of all law-administration, 
sufficiently potent in his own relationships with those who actually 
perform it to serve as an effective counter to a feared Congress.”226 
Moreover, this constitutional structure reflects careful and considered 
choices—not mere accidents of history. As Professor Redish and 
Cisar explain, “In structuring their unique governmental form, the 
Framers sought to avoid undue concentrations of power by resort to 
institutional devices designed to foster three political values: 
checking, diversity, and accountability.”227 
Unlike the legislative and judicial branches, which are headed by 
collegial institutions, Article II squarely vests the executive power of 
the United States in the president: “The executive Power shall be 
vested in a President of the United States of America.”228 Some judges 
and legal academics argue that, in combination with the Take Care 
Clause,229 the Vesting Clause of Article II requires that the president 
enjoy plenary control over the activities of the executive branch.230 As 
 
 225. Peter L. Strauss, Foreword: Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in 
Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 696 (2007). 
 226. Strauss, supra note 151, at 597. 
 227. Redish & Cisar, supra note 2, at 451. 
 228. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 229. See id. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed . . . .”). 
 230. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 31, at 1165–67, 1207–08; Prakash, supra note 31, at 992; 
see also Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 44 (“The President 
retains the constitutional power to direct the officer to take particular actions . . . or to refrain 
from acting . . . .”); Susan M. Davies, Comment, Congressional Encroachment on Executive 
Branch Communications, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297, 1300 (1990) (“[The Framers] created a 
unitary executive, popularly elected and politically accountable: a single person in whom all 
executive power would reside.”). The Framers, of course, did not provide for popular election of 
the president. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the 
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators 
and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress . . . .”). The equal voting 
rights of the states in the Senate make the Electoral College’s composition deeply undemocratic 
(for example, Wyoming and Alaska enjoy grossly disproportionate voting strength); thus, the 
House of Representatives has more democratic legitimacy than the president, if democratic 
legitimacy requires respect for the principle of equal voting power among citizens. See Reynolds 
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 576 (1964) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause requires both houses of a 
state legislature to be appointed on a population basis . . . .”); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207–
08 (1962) (recognizing the validity of a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 1, alleging an “irrational disregard of the standard of apportionment prescribed 
in the State Constitution or of any standard, effecting a gross disproportion of representation to 
voting population” and holding that “[a] citizen’s right to a vote free of arbitrary impairment by 
KROTOSZYNSKI IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2012  10:33 PM 
1642 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:1599 
Justice Scalia has explained, “It is not for [the Court] to determine, 
and we have never presumed to determine, how much of the purely 
executive powers of government must be within the full control of the 
President. The Constitution prescribes that they all are.”231 
Both the Vesting and Take Care Clauses indicate that the 
Framers intended to create a unitary national officer with the ability 
and the duty to take primary responsibility for the implementation of 
federal law. As Professor Strauss notes, “Of the decisions clearly 
taken, perhaps none was as important as the judgment to vest the 
executive power in a single, elected official, the President.”232 
Moreover, whether “the President is to be a decider or a mere 
overseer, or something between, [the Constitution] requires that he 
have significant, ongoing relationships with all agencies responsible 
for law-administration.”233 
In addition, the Opinions Clause234 supports the claim that the 
president must enjoy the ability to oversee the execution of federal 
law, even when Congress places particular administrative tasks in the 
hands of specific agencies or departments. The Opinions Clause 
provides that “[t]he President . . . may require the Opinion, in writing, 
of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon 
any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices.”235 Note 
that this power is facially limited to the “principal Officer” within an 
executive department; it does not encompass inferior officers within 
an executive department or mere employees. If the Framers intended 
Article II to give the president virtually unfettered authority over 
presidential appointees, why did they include a specific clause 
granting the president the power to require his appointees to provide 
written opinions regarding matters falling within “the Duties of their 
respective Offices”? 
As one astute legal scholar argues, “A reasonable interpretation 
of the Opinions Clause is that it exists because it was not assumed, or 
at the very least not obvious, that the President had absolute power 
 
state action has been judicially recognized as a right secured by the Constitution, when such 
impairment resulted from a dilution by a false tally”). 
 231. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 709 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 232. Strauss, supra note 151, at 599. 
 233. Id. at 648. 
 234. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 235. Id. 
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over heads of departments.”236 Thus, the existence of the Opinions 
Clause perhaps suggests that the president’s authority over 
subordinates could be somewhat circumscribed; even if the president 
possesses the power to fire an appointee, he might not necessarily 
have the power to otherwise control or compel an appointee to do a 
particular task, even a task as innocuous as offering the president an 
opinion, in writing, about the operations of the department.237 
Nevertheless, the Opinions Clause is “expressive of the 
President’s necessary relationship with those parts of government 
responsible for administering its laws” and “[has] sharp implications 
for congressional controls.”238 As Professor Strauss explains, “No 
agency could be made so independent of presidential oversight as to 
deny that relationship.”239 And “the strong implication” of the 
Opinions Clause “is that the communication the President may 
demand would be one made to him in private and made in time for 
relevant action or response on his part (that is, prior to the agency’s 
own final decision).”240 This duty of timely communication on the part 
of those implementing federal law “would obtain whether the 
President were entitled to direct the outcome, only to speak to it, or 
merely to be informed what is likely to occur.”241 After-the-fact 
communication would not be sufficient because such an approach 
“would deny any effective President-agency relationship and would 
inhibit the President’s capacity to mobilize the remainder of 
government to respond to the measure being taken.”242 
Thus, even if Article II calls merely for presidential oversight, 
rather than direct presidential control, of the administration of 
federal law, constitutional problems would exist in the delegation of 
 
 236. Morton Rosenberg, Congress’s Prerogative over Agencies and Agency Decisionmakers: 
The Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration’s Theory of the Unitary Executive, 57 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 627, 689 (1989). 
 237. See Rosenberg, supra note 236, at 689–90 (“A broad reading of the Take Care Clause 
would have the effect of reducing the Opinions Clause—which appears among the grant of 
major presidential powers in section two—to surplusage.”); A. Michael Froomkin, Note, In 
Defense of Administrative Agency Autonomy, 96 YALE L.J. 787, 800–01 (1987) (arguing that the 
Opinions Clause refutes the inference that the president should enjoy plenary power over all 
executive-branch officers and asking “[i]f the President has so much control over the executive 
that he can fire at will, why put the power to request written opinions in the Constitution?”). 
 238. Strauss, supra note 151, at 647. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
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federal executive authority to non-Article II officials. Professor 
Strauss observes that “[e]ffective presidential power to control 
subordinates may be substantially a function of his ability to enforce 
his wishes, to remove persons in whom he lacks political confidence 
or, less broadly, who disobey his valid directives.”243 The president, 
however, lacks any direct supervisory powers over state officers 
enforcing federal laws, including any power to set enforcement 
priorities or to remove state officers in whom he lacks confidence.244 
With respect to delegations outside of the government entirely, to 
private entities such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers,245 the president’s powers are even more attenuated and, 
as a consequence, the separation-of-powers problem is particularly 
acute. 
When Congress chooses to export the enforcement of federal law 
to state and private entities, it denies the president any direct power 
to oversee the enforcement of federal law. “Such a mechanism, if 
permitted here, would quickly teach Congress how to avoid 
presidential controls, and would sacrifice the unitary character of the 
Presidency.”246 Moreover, as Professor Redish and Cisar observe, 
“[T]he separation of powers must operate in a prophylactic manner—
in other words as a means of preventing a situation in which one 
branch has acquired a level of power sufficient to allow it to subvert 
popular sovereignty and individual liberty.”247 
Unlike more fluid concepts such as equal protection or the 
prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment, which incorporate 
evolving standards of morality and decency, structural devices aimed 
 
 243. Id. at 607. Though he is a functionalist, even Professor Strauss acknowledges that the 
president must enjoy some power of oversight over the implementation of federal law. 
 244. See Camkiner, supra note 6, at 1082–83 (“More narrowly, there is scant historical 
support for the originalist claim that presidential supervision of federal law implementation 
necessarily extends beyond federal officials to encompass state officials and private individuals 
as well.” (footnotes omitted)); Krent, supra note 12, at 71–73 (“In choosing to vest in the states 
the authority to implement federal programs, Congress has placed significant segments of 
federal law enforcement and implementation . . . outside the executive branch’s practical 
control.”). But cf. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 10, at 595–96, 598, 639–41 (arguing that the 
president may constitutionally claim a unilateral power to direct or remove state officers when 
such officers enforce federal law). 
 245. See supra notes 7, 17 and accompanying text. 
 246. Strauss, supra note 151, at 652. 
 247. Redish & Cisar, supra note 2, at 463. 
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at protecting individual liberty248 through careful institutional checks 
and balances are not obviously meant to evolve with time. “No critic 
has adequately demonstrated either that the fears of undue 
concentrations of political power that caused the Framers to impose 
separation of powers are unjustified, or that separation of powers is 
not an important means of deterring those concentrations.”249 
Finally, cooperative-federalism programs may also raise serious 
constitutional issues under the Appointments Clause250 of Article II. 
Principal officers must be appointed by the president with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, and inferior officers must be either 
(1) appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the 
Senate or (2) appointed by the president alone, the courts of law, or 
the head of an executive department.251 A state official charged with 
enforcing federal workplace-safety or environmental standards is not 
appointed in either fashion. Given that the state agencies that 
administer cooperative-federalism programs engage in investigation 
and prosecution, actions that are quintessentially executive in nature, 
there is an argument to be made, at least post-Free Enterprise Fund, 
that these officers must be appointed in a fashion that complies with 
the Appointments Clause. If this objection is valid, then the 
Constitution requires the president to have not just removal, but also 
appointment, authority over a significant number of state and private 
employees. 
B. Government Accountability 
Government accountability is diminished, not enhanced, through 
the enforcement of federal law by nonfederal agents.252 As Professor 
Strauss observes, “Individual agencies almost necessarily lack the 
political accountability and the intellectual and fiscal resources 
 
 248. See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 
1513, 1515–17 (1991) (noting that the protection of individual rights is the goal of the separation 
of powers). 
 249. Redish & Cisar, supra note 2, at 471. 
 250. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 251. Id.; see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 
3162–64 (2010) (discussing the power of an independent agency to appoint “inferior officers” 
and the Appointments Clause more generally). 
 252. See, e.g., Super, supra note 16, at 1461–64 (discussing the shortcomings and pitfalls of 
divided responsibility in the context of disaster-response efforts, including delegations of 
responsibility to state government, local government, and even private entities and arguing that 
“[f]ragmentation of responsibility across levels of government . . . has undermined disaster 
management efforts in the United States”). 
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necessary to achieve such balancing and coordination.”253 What is true 
of federal agencies holds doubly true of state administrative agencies 
and private entities. 
The president is a unique national officer, the only person 
selected by the people as a whole and accountable to the people as a 
whole, who brings national concerns to bear when executing the 
duties of his office.254 As then-Professor Elena Kagan notes, 
“Presidential administration promotes accountability” by 
“enhanc[ing] transparency, enabl[ing] the public to comprehend more 
accurately the sources and nature of bureaucratic power” and by 
“establish[ing] an electoral link between the public and the 
bureaucracy, increasing the latter’s responsiveness to the former.”255 
Professor Strauss echoes these views, writing, “The unitary 
responsibility thus expressed, and sharply intended, does not admit 
relationships in which the President is permitted so little capacity to 
engage in oversight that the public could no longer rationally believe 
in that responsibility.”256 Professor Strauss suggests that “an agency 
over which the President’s control went no further than the power to 
appoint its heads should be found deficient.”257 Yet the president lacks 
even this power with respect to the state agencies that implement 
federal laws. 
The same concept holds true when Congress delegates 
administrative responsibilities to private organizations over which the 
president lacks any meaningful powers of appointment, supervision 
and control, or removal. But, as Professor Strauss powerfully argues, 
“[T]he presidential oversight function must in some sense be 
recognized; even an administrator has power and is not merely a 
 
 253. Strauss, supra note 151, at 663. 
 254. WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 67–68 
(Transaction Publishers 2002) (1908); see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 
U.S. 120, 190 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he President and Vice President are the only 
public officials whom the entire Nation elects.”); Saikrishna B. Prakash, Branches Behaving 
Badly: The Predictable and Often Desirable Consequences of the Separation of Powers, 12 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 543, 546 (2003) (“[M]any people welcome the President’s 
relatively recent and much larger role in tax and spending policy because they believe that the 
President is the only elected federal official who considers the welfare of the entire country in 
making tax and spending decisions.”); Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 
AM. U. L. REV. 259, 335 (2009) (“The nation looks to the President, and not to Congress, for 
leadership in dealing with crises, and for good reason. The President is the only national official 
who is elected by the entire country.”). 
 255. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331–32 (2001). 
 256. Strauss, supra note 151, at 648–49 (footnote omitted). 
 257. Id. at 649. 
KROTOSZYNSKI IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2012  10:33 PM 
2012] THE NEW FORMALISM 1647 
clerk.”258 Thus, an “effective, unitary executive” implies “the need for 
a substantial presidential relationship with any agency performing a 
significant government duty.”259 
If executive responsibility is fractured through congressional 
delegations to state governments or private entities that will act free 
and clear of any direct day-to-day supervision by the president, then 
accountability will be the poorer for it. For example, citizens 
displeased with environmental enforcement, labor regulation, or the 
like, will be hard pressed to determine where to place blame or fault. 
As Justice O’Connor observed in New York v. United States,260 
“[W]here the Federal Government compels States to regulate, the 
accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished.”261 
Justice O’Connor further explained, 
If the citizens of New York, for example, do not consider that 
making provision for the disposal of radioactive waste is in their best 
interest, they may elect state officials who share their view. That 
view can always be pre-empted under the Supremacy Clause if it is 
contrary to the national view, but in such a case it is the Federal 
Government that makes the decision in full view of the public, and it 
will be federal officials that suffer the consequences if the decision 
turns out to be detrimental or unpopular. But where the Federal 
Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials 
who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal 
officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated 
from the electoral ramifications of their decision.262 
This concept of political accountability requires clear lines of 
responsibility, so that citizens may fix responsibility for programs—
whether popular or unpopular—at the appropriate level of 
government. Notably, “[a]ccountability is . . . diminished when, due to 
federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance 
with the views of the local electorate in matters not pre-empted by 
federal regulation.”263 
 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. at 641 (emphasis added). 
 260. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 261. Id. at 168. 
 262. Id. at 168–69. 
 263. Id. at 169; see also Kagan, supra note 255, at 2332 (noting that “presidential control of 
administration at the least possesses advantages over any alternative control device in 
advancing . . . core democratic values”). 
KROTOSZYNSKI IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2012  10:33 PM 
1648 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:1599 
Justice O’Connor, like Justice Scalia in Printz, nevertheless 
asserted that a state’s voluntary adoption of a federal responsibility, 
by undertaking primary responsibility for enforcement of a federal 
program, does not present any serious accountability problems264: 
“Where Congress encourages state regulation rather than compelling 
it, state governments remain responsive to the local electorate’s 
preferences; state officials remain accountable to the people.”265 But a 
state that volunteers to enforce regulations established by the federal 
government may not know precisely what rules it has agreed to 
enforce within its jurisdiction. And when a state enforces an 
unpopular federal mandate, state citizens are likely to be confused 
about where to fix the political blame—with state legislators in the 
local state capitol, with state executive officers, with members of 
Congress, or with the president and the administration. The problem 
of fuzzy lines of responsibility, and hence of diminished political 
accountability, simply does not turn on whether the state’s 
assumption of federal duties is voluntary or coerced. 
The other problem with Justice O’Connor’s reliance on 
voluntary state participation in cooperative-federalism programs as a 
panacea for potential accountability problems is the possibility that 
participation may not actually be voluntary. To a tremendous degree, 
states have become financially dependent on the federal largesse that 
flows from ostensibly voluntary agreements to enforce federal laws.266 
For example, almost two dozen states have joined a lawsuit seeking 
the invalidation of the ACA, while at the same time, many of these 
very same state governments accept federal grants to administer 
state-sponsored insurance exchanges, a key provision of the ACA.267 
 
 264. Compare Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929 (1997) (noting that previous cases 
“upheld the statutory provisions at issue precisely because they did not commandeer state 
government, but merely imposed preconditions to continued state regulation of an otherwise 
pre-empted field”), with infra text accompanying note 265. 
 265. New York, 505 U.S. at 168. 
 266. ALICE M. RIVLIN, REVIVING THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE ECONOMY, THE STATES, 
AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 82–100 (1992); Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental 
Mandates and the “New (New) Federalism”: Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?, 81 MINN. L. 
REV. 97, 116–20 (1996); see also DAVID B. WALKER, THE REBIRTH OF FEDERALISM: 
SLOUCHING TOWARD WASHINGTON 8, 92–150, 139, 234–40 (1995) (discussing several federal-
subsidy programs and the conditions that Congress attaches to such financial aid to the states); 
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 345, 372–
73 (2008) (noting that states have become dependent on “federal largesse”). 
 267. Brandon Stewart, List of 27 States Suing over Obamacare, HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 17, 
2011, 4:00 PM), http://blog.heritage.org/2011/01/17/list-of-states-suing-over-obamacare; see also 
State Actions To Implement Health Insurance Exchanges, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
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There is a deep irony in states’ volunteering to create the 
administrative structures necessary to implement the ACA at the 
same time that they are asking the federal courts to invalidate the law 
in whole or in part.268 
In New York, Justice O’Connor observed that “[s]tates are not 
mere political subdivisions of the United States” and that “[s]tate 
governments are neither regional offices nor administrative agencies 
of the Federal Government.”269 These observations are accurate, but 
also highly problematic for the project of cooperative federalism, at 
least if the president is to have a meaningful role in supervising and 
directing the day-to-day work of state agencies engaged in enforcing 
federal law. Divided responsibility for the administration of federal 
law means divided accountability that even the most politically astute 
citizen cannot ascertain with certainty or confidence. Indeed, the 
whole raison d’être of cooperative federalism is avoiding clear 
political responsibility for the specific iteration of federal labor, 
environmental, and healthcare programs administered by the states.270 
The notion that the president could control and directly 
supervise state officers is also problematic because the states are 
supposedly governmental entities that enjoy “residuary and inviolable 
sovereignty.”271 The level of control and supervision necessary to 
successfully satisfy the Vesting and Take Care Clauses seems entirely 
incompatible with the notion of meaningful state sovereignty. Thus, 
cooperative federalism seems inconsistent with a strong iteration of 
the unitary-executive theory, and its flaws cannot be fixed without 
doing significant violence to core federalism principles. 
Perhaps Congress could require by statute, and states could 
voluntarily accept, a general federal executive supervisory power over 
 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/state-actions-to-implement-the-
health-benefit-exch.aspx (last updated Mar. 1, 2012). 
 268. But cf. Strauss, supra note 151, at 642 (“The day-to-day course of national affairs 
generates new issues to which a coherent response must be made . . . .”). 
 269. New York, 505 U.S. at 188. 
 270. See Greve, supra note 13, at 559 (“Cooperative federalism undermines political 
transparency and accountability, thereby heightening civic disaffection and cynicism; diminishes 
policy competition among the states; and erodes self-government and liberty.”); see also id. at 
603–07 (objecting to cooperative-federalism programs because they diminish political 
accountability). Professor Michael Greve suggests that “[t]he sooner we can think of viable 
means to curtail cooperative programs and to disentangle government functions, the better off 
we shall be.” Id. at 559. 
 271. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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state officials charged with administering federal programs incident to 
a cooperative-federalism scheme. But even if a state’s own 
constitution and courts would permit this outcome,272 concerns about 
blurred lines of accountability would still exist. To use a state 
government as a kind of administrative hand puppet of the federal 
government would seem to invite the kind of blurred lines of 
responsibility that the New York majority found objectionable in the 
first place. 
Thus, the separation-of-powers/federalism dilemma comes into 
much clearer focus: Preserve the real independence of the state 
governments that administer federal programs, and the arrangement 
does violence to the separation of powers by transferring core 
executive functions outside the federal executive branch. Secure 
meaningful presidential oversight of state government officials when 
they execute federal law, and the arrangement does violence to the 
principles of federalism that treat states as fully sovereign and 
independent entities. 
As then-Professor Kagan has previously noted, the Take Care 
Clause, “[a]lthough framed in the language of duty rather than 
power, . . . may imply some minimum amount of presidential 
oversight authority, on the theory that the President could not 
perform this function if unable to require information from and 
engage in consultations with agency officials.”273 And, as Professor 
Strauss argues, “The President’s responsibility to coordinate the 
activities of all government, however, sets him apart from private and 
congressional actors.”274 The duty and responsibility for coordinating 
the enforcement of federal law cannot be undertaken by fifty 
different governments without a significant loss of accountability. 
 
 272. Cf. William Van Alstyne, “Thirty Pieces of Silver” for the Rights of Your People: 
Irresistible Offers Reconsidered as a Matter of State Constitutional Law, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 303, 305 (1991) (noting that “there is good reason for the renewed interest in the 
independent efficacy of state constitutional law as a set of restrictions on what state and local 
government may presume to do”); id. at 307 (arguing that “state and local governments may not 
accept federal funds when, were they to do so, they would at once put at risk such rights as they 
are forbidden by state constitutional law to abridge”). 
 273. Kagan, supra note 255, at 2324 n.311. Then-Professor Kagan also notes that “the 
President may have what Peter Strauss and Cass Sunstein have called ‘procedural’ supervisory 
authority over administrative officers, enabling the President to demand information from and 
engage in consultation with them.” Id. at 2324 (quoting Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The 
Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 200 (1986)). 
 274. Strauss, supra note 151, at 660. 
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Professor Strauss aptly explains the problems with dividing and 
separating the entities charged with enforcing federal law: 
  The power to balance competing goals—and the concomitant 
power to influence at least to some degree the agencies’ exercise of 
discretion—can only be the President’s; leaving the balancing 
functions in the agencies would create multiheaded government, 
government with neither the capacity to come to a definitive 
resolution nor the ability to see that any resolution is honored in all 
agencies to which it may apply. This outcome does not vary with 
whether or not the agencies are denominated independent. Once 
one has acknowledged that any discretion conferred must be 
exercised within the legal bounds set for it, failure to recognize the 
President’s claim to shape its exercise would deny central premises 
of constitutional structure as sharply as would a denial of Congress’s 
claim to set the legal bounds.275 
Dean Caminker seconds these concerns, observing that “[o]nly a 
unitary President can ensure that nationally enacted policies are 
administered in such a way that national rather than parochial 
interests are truly served.”276 
The centralization of presidential review of agency work product 
also bears at least a brief mention in this context because this 
systematic review process constitutes an essential bulwark of securing 
accountable governance at the federal level. All federal 
administrative agencies, whether “independent” or not, provide 
information about their activities to the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), a division of the White House’s Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB).277 In turn, OIRA maintains a 
centralized listing of major agency actions and engages in systematic 
oversight of agency activities—and particularly agency rulemaking.278 
 
 275. Id. at 663; see also Super, supra note 16, at 1409–27 (providing reasons commonly 
advanced in support of the federal government’s creation of administrative systems that 
maximize discretion in various constituent parts, but questioning whether any of these 
rationales are ultimately persuasive). 
 276. Caminker, supra note 6, at 1108–09. 
 277. Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 824–30 (2003); see also Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New 
Executive Order for Improving Federal Regulation?: Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 1489–1510 (2002) (comparing and describing the Reagan and Clinton 
OIRA review programs); Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 273, at 182–83, 189–90, 193, 197–202 
(discussing, describing, and advocating OIRA review of pending regulatory proposals). 
 278. See Exec. Order No. 13,422, § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. 191, 191 (2008) (requiring each agency to 
identify and explain the required agency action so that the president could determine “whether 
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Through this centralized OIRA review process, the president 
and administration bring a unified and national perspective to bear on 
the myriad policies that federal regulatory statutes implicate. As 
Professor Strauss notes, “The President has used executive orders and 
OMB directives (the OMB being the principal although hardly the 
only instrument of his coordinating activities) to create 
supplementary coordinating regimes of a generally uncontroversial 
character.”279 This centralized review process permits a uniform, 
national approach to both substantive and procedural issues; 
presidential oversight facilitates the development and implementation 
of “government-wide initiatives ranging from electronic government 
to energy policy.”280 
State constitutional officers and state agencies do not appear 
anywhere on the federal government’s organizational chart.281 
Precisely because state constitutional officers and administrative 
agencies are not part of the federal government, the president’s 
ability to oversee, much less control, the actions of such officers and 
entities is, at best, highly attenuated. Indeed, the president cannot 
even specify the procedures that a state agency must use when 
exercising delegated federal authority.282 
 
any new regulation is warranted” (internal quotation mark omitted)); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 
C.F.R. 638, 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 745, 745 (2006) (“The objectives of 
this Executive order are to enhance planning and coordination with respect to both new and 
existing regulations . . . .”). For helpful and comprehensive reviews of the contemporary practice 
of White House review of agency activities, see generally James Blumstein, Regulatory Review 
by the Executive Office of the President: An Overview and Policy Analysis of Current Issues, 51 
DUKE L.J. 851 (2001); Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of 
Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075 (1986); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The 
President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994). 
 279. Strauss, supra note 225, at 718 (footnote omitted). 
 280. Id. 
 281. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992). 
 282. Cf. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 69–71 (2005) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the 
federal statute at issue in the case permitted the states to determine procedure for actions 
brought under the statute); Andreen, supra note 4, at 259–60 (noting that states determine the 
operational details and procedures governing their state environmental laws); Lisa Brodoff, 
Lifting Burdens: Proof, Social Justice, and Public Assistance Administrative Hearings, 32 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 131, 163–64 (2008) (noting that states may apply their local 
administrative procedure acts or other procedures in the context of public-assistance hearings, 
including assignment of the burden of proof in such hearings); Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative 
Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 190–93 (2005) (noting that 
states develop and apply their own implementation programs and procedures in federal 
environmental cooperative-federalism programs); Joseph R. Oliveri, Note, Converse-Erie: The 
Key to Federalism in an Increasingly Administrative State, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1372, 1383–
87, 1389–91 (2008) (noting that in the absence of a federal statute requiring a particular 
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This lack of oversight and control, in turn, has profound 
implications for facilitating governmental accountability. Cooperative 
federalism splits responsibility—both with respect to procedural and 
substantive questions—without providing any means of securing real-
time centralized presidential superintendence of state enforcement of 
federal law. Thus, shared responsibility means, in practice, blurred 
lines of accountability. Whether the loss of political accountability, 
standing alone, would justify the judicial invalidation of such 
programs is an open question. The loss of accountability, however, in 
tandem with the departure from the structural imperatives of Article 
II, could work to support a formalist separation-of-powers 
jurisprudence that disallows, on constitutional grounds, contemporary 
cooperative-federalism practices. 
C. The Problem of Nonuniformity in Federal Law 
A comprehensive policy analysis of the costs and benefits of 
cooperative-federalism programs lies beyond the scope of this 
Article. Nevertheless, one specific aspect of the literature on 
cooperative federalism seems particularly salient in thinking about 
the constitutionality of cooperative-federalism programs in light of 
Free Enterprise Fund: “uncooperative federalism.” 
Professors Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken coined 
the phrase “uncooperative federalism” to describe how states use the 
power to administer federal laws to depart in significant ways from 
both congressional and presidential policies. They explain, 
  Uncooperative federalism occurs when states carrying out the 
Patriot Act refuse to enforce the portions they deem 
unconstitutional, when states implementing federal environmental 
law use that power to push federal authorities to take a new 
position, or when states relying on federal funds create welfare 
 
procedure, states are free to establish their own administrative procedures, subject only to due-
process constraints). Indeed, given Printz and New York, which together establish a strong 
federalism-based anticommandeering rule that insulates state executive and legislative officers 
from any general duty to directly implement federal law, see Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 
898, 935 (1997) (prohibiting commandeering of state executive officers); New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 168–69, 188 (1992) (prohibiting the commandeering of state legislative 
officers), it is not entirely clear whether Congress could impose particular procedural rules on 
state agencies enforcing state-law programs enacted to enforce federal labor, environmental, or 
healthcare objectives. 
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programs that erode the foundations of the very policies they are 
being asked to carry out.283 
In these cases, and many others like them, “states use regulatory 
power conferred by the federal government to tweak, challenge, and 
even dissent from federal law.”284 Despite the ubiquity of states’ going 
rogue, as it were, “we do not have a vocabulary for describing it, let 
alone a fully developed account of why it happens, what it means, and 
what implications it holds for the doctrinal debates in which 
federalism scholars routinely engage.”285 
Professors Bulman-Pozen and Gerken identify serious 
nonuniformity problems with cooperative-federalism programs that 
should greatly concern the conservative majority on the Supreme 
Court. For example, a “state’s leverage over the federal government 
only increases after the federal government has devolved regulatory 
power to the state.”286 They explain that, “[h]aving taken on the states 
as partners, the national government’s threat to exit becomes less 
credible.”287 Thus, states possess “an additional set of leverage points 
that state officials use to push their agenda.”288 Indeed, the empirical 
reality is that federal agencies almost never suspend state primacy, 
once it is established.289 Professors Bulman-Pozen and Gerken 
speculate, “As the years go by, we would expect federal dependence 
to increase as state bureaucrats develop institutional competence and 
area-specific expertise.”290 From a separation-of-powers perspective, 
however, the notion of a coequal relationship is problematic, for it 
implies an absence of effective or meaningful federal executive 
control and oversight. 
Moreover, if the federal government’s dependence on state 
officials to administer federal law deepens over time, it would seem 
that meaningful federal supervision will become largely impossible—
quite illusory in fact—because the federal government will not know 
 
 283. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 13, at 1258–59. 
 284. Id. at 1259. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 1268. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. at 1286. 
 289. Robertson, supra note 202, at 606; see also Puder & Paque, supra note 173, at 86 (“Few 
case studies involving program termination scenarios exist.”); Zahren, supra note 212, at 418 
(“However, the threat of withdrawal is almost completely unrealistic, creates too much tension, 
and might discourage some states from adopting a program at all.”). 
 290. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 13, at 1268. 
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precisely what the states are doing, how they are doing it, or the 
reasons why. “Faithful execution” becomes largely, if not completely, 
inverted. Indeed, “[o]ne might wonder if we have come full circle, 
claiming that the servant has power because it possesses the same 
autonomy enjoyed by the sovereign.”291 In the context of state 
administration of federal environmental laws, for example, Professor 
Andreen argues that some states “are engaging, at least in part, in a 
race to the bottom to attract and retain industry through weaker 
environmental standards, lax implementation, and lethargic 
enforcement.”292 Yet the purpose of federal environmental standards 
is precisely to avoid the race to the bottom that entirely local state 
standards would inevitably produce.293 
Without belaboring the point, Professors Bulman-Pozen and 
Gerken identify other problems with existing cooperative-federalism 
practice and formalist separation-of-powers-theory orthodoxy. For 
example, “[e]ven when state officials carry out federal programs, their 
constituencies are based within the state,” which, in practice, means 
that “those voters may have put in place political elites who have 
quite different views of federal policy than voters nationally, thus 
creating pressure for state officials not to go along with federal 
authority.”294 Moreover, incentive will almost certainly be married 
with opportunity: “The fact that state officials serve two masters gives 
states not only a reason to challenge federal policy, but also the 
power to do so.”295 Thus, the presence of an alternative power base 
renders state agency officials much less accountable to the president 
than their federal agency counterparts would be. 
Finally, states can serve as flashpoints for organized opposition 
to federal programs. “Forcing state officials to participate in a federal 
scheme they oppose may generate more allies for the citizens who 
oppose the scheme.”296 Thus, “it may be that federal-state integration, 
rather than autonomy, creates more incentives for state governments 
to check the federal government.”297 
 
 291. Id. 
 292. Andreen, supra note 4, at 261. 
 293. See RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 4, at 22 (“The ‘race-to-the-bottom’ 
theory posits that federal regulation is needed to prevent states from competing for industrial 
development by reducing their environment standards to ‘sub-optimal levels.’”). 
 294. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 13, at 1270 (footnote omitted). 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. at 1291. 
 297. Id. 
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From this perspective, commandeering or coercive voluntary 
cooperative-federalism programs are a good thing because “[i]f states 
can simply opt out of a program with which they disagree, they may 
not have much incentive to devote the resources needed to mount an 
effective challenge to federal policy.”298 This goes beyond merely co-
opting a federal program and redeploying it along more congenial 
lines; instead, the notion is that a state government could participate 
in a federal program with the hope of ultimately either crippling or 
destroying it. To the extent that the Framers sought to create an 
effective, dynamic, and energetic national executive,299 the 
shortcomings of a system that permits entrenched opposition from 
within should be self-evident. States should not be free to “ride with 
the cops and cheer for the robbers.”300 
Professor Margaret Lemos identifies yet another area in which 
state government freelancing occurs: state enforcement of federal 
law.301 She correctly notes that “[i]f enforcement controls the effective 
meaning of the law, it matters a great deal who controls the 
enforcement.”302 In theory, under the doctrine established in Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,303 the national 
executive branch is best suited to fill in statutory gaps left by 
Congress; a reviewing federal court faced with a statutory ambiguity 
will defer to any reasonable agency interpretation of the statutory 
text.304 And even in circumstances in which Chevron deference does 
not apply, Skidmore v. Swift & Co.305 requires that a reviewing court 
 
 298. Id. 
 299. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(noting that “[e]nergy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good 
government”); see also Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 10, at 581–85, 614–15, 639–42 (arguing 
that the Framers anticipated and provided for comprehensive and effective presidential 
oversight of all aspects of the administration of federal law). Hamilton adds that “[t]he 
ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are unity; duration; an adequate provision 
for its support; and competent powers.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra, at 424.  
 300. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 394 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 
petitioner) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 301. See Lemos, supra note 13, at 699–701 (noting that the practical effects of federal law 
will vary depending on state-enforcement practices). 
 302. Id. at 700. 
 303. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 304. See id. at 844 (“Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular 
question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own 
construction of a statutory [provision] for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator 
of an agency.”). 
 305. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
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still accord substantial deference to a federal agency’s interpretation 
of its organic act.306 
State enforcement of federal law shatters this model and permits 
state officials—often state attorneys general—to pursue an 
independent vision of the meaning and substantive goals of federal 
laws. Accordingly, as Professor Lemos suggests, “[E]nforcement 
authority can serve as a potent means of state influence by enabling 
states to adjust the intensity of enforcement and to press their own 
interpretations of federal law.”307 Nevertheless, as Professor Abbe 
Gluck notes, “For all the focus in recent statutory interpretation 
doctrine and theory on the administrative state and on dialogic 
interpretation, we have virtually no doctrines or theories that 
acknowledge, much less account for, the role of state implementers in 
the hermeneutical project of federal statutory construction.”308 
In this respect, the more room Congress leaves for gap filling 
through policymaking, the greater the risk to uniformity in federal 
law and to the president’s ability to oversee federal law’s execution 
and enforcement. Professor Lemos correctly notes that “[t]he 
potential for divergence between state and federal law approaches to 
enforcement is even greater in areas where federal law is written in 
broad terms—particularly where no federal agency has authority to 
narrow and clarify the law through binding regulations.”309 Moreover, 
it would be a mistake to assume that this gap-filling authority would 
necessarily be used wisely to advance national objectives. As 
 
 306. See id. at 140 (“We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the 
Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, 
do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may 
properly resort for guidance.”). See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: 
Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 735, 739–49 (2002) (discussing the interplay between Chevron and Skidmore and arguing 
that expertise, rather than an implied—perhaps entirely fictional—delegation of policymaking 
authority, better justifies federal court deference to agency statutory interpretations). 
 307. Lemos, supra note 13, at 702. Professor Lemos draws a distinction between state 
“enforcement” of federal law and state “implementation” of federal law. Id. at 715 (emphasis 
omitted). A state “implements” federal law when it adopts and enforces standards established 
by the federal government, whereas a state “enforces” federal law when it directly applies 
federal laws free and clear of any direct federal supervision by executive-branch personnel. See 
id. at 715–19. State enforcement of federal law “breaks that link” between the sovereign that 
makes the law and the sovereign that enforces the law “by authorizing state actors to enforce 
the law of a different sovereign.” Id. at 715. Thus, in at least some cases, states may find 
themselves enforcing a federal law that they lack the authority to enact in the first place. 
 308. Gluck, supra note 13, at 537. 
 309. Lemos, supra note 13, at 739. 
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Professor Lemos observes, “Decentralized regulatory authority 
creates risks as well as rewards, as regulations tailored to state 
interests may interfere with the broader national interest.”310 
Congress’s decision to vest either the administration or 
enforcement of federal law with the states may “reflect[] a judgment 
that the benefits of decentralized decision making outweigh the 
possible costs to uniformity.”311 But is this a choice that Congress is 
free to make in the first place? If the Constitution mandates that the 
power to administer and enforce federal law must rest in hands 
ultimately accountable to the president, Professor Lemos’s 
description of the effects of state enforcement of federal law should 
be deeply unsettling.312 
Presidential oversight directly addresses and helps to resolve the 
problem of nonuniformity in the enforcement of federal law and 
avoids the problem of local, parochial interests’ trumping the 
achievement of national objectives in areas such as environmental 
protection, worker safety, and access to healthcare. As Justice Kagan 
astutely notes, “[B]ecause the President has a national constituency, 
he is likely to consider, in setting the direction of administrative 
policy on an ongoing basis, the preferences of the general public, 
rather than merely parochial interests.”313 Moreover, “[p]residential 
administration . . . advances political accountability by subjecting the 
bureaucracy to the control mechanism most open to public 
examination and most responsive to public opinion.”314 And, perhaps 
most importantly, presidential oversight of the administration of 
federal law “furthers regulatory effectiveness by providing not only 
the centralization necessary to achieve a range of technocratic goals 
but also the dynamic charge so largely missing today from both the 
administrative sphere and the surrounding political system.”315 
Because “[s]tates use their power as federal servants to resist, 
challenge, and even dissent from federal policy,”316 the need for 
effective forms of federal executive control should be self-evident. 
 
 310. Id. at 744. 
 311. Id. at 756. 
 312. See Greve, supra note 13, at 559 (“Cooperative federalism undermines political 
transparency and accountability, thereby heightening civic disaffection and cynicism; diminishes 
policy competition among the states; and erodes self-government and liberty.”). 
 313. Kagan, supra note 255, at 2335. 
 314. Id. at 2384. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 13, at 1307. 
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States are not simply “‘cooperative’ friends and allies to the federal 
government,” but also can be and are “rival[s], challenger[s], and 
dissenter[s].”317 The alternative to centralized federal control is a 
potpourri of divergent, perhaps even conflicting, policies pursued in 
the name of federal laws that ostensibly established uniform 
standards for workplace safety, the environment, and access to 
healthcare services. 
V.  POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS AND REJOINDERS TO A BROAD 
READING OF FREE ENTERPRISE FUND 
The arguments I present in favor of finding a separation-of-
powers problem with cooperative-federalism programs can be 
answered—perhaps even effectively. First, the entire problem could 
be avoided if the Supreme Court were to hold that when states 
participate in cooperative-federalism programs, they enforce only 
state law. Second, the Supreme Court could invoke the various forms 
of indirect control that federal executive agencies possess over states 
participating in cooperative-federalism programs and hold that these 
oversight devices fully satisfy the requirements of Article II. Third, 
and finally, the Supreme Court could simply refuse to follow the 
broader implications of Free Enterprise Fund to their logical 
conclusion; this solution would largely constitute a reprise of the 
Justices’ treatment of the broad statements in Printz and Lujan about 
the essential nature of presidential control and oversight of the 
execution of all federal laws. 
A. States Do Not Enforce Federal Law in Cooperative-Federalism 
Programs 
The most potent response to a separation-of-powers objection to 
cooperative-federalism programs is that the states simply do not 
enforce federal law at all, but only state law. Dean Caminker makes 
this argument in some detail, suggesting that “the better 
understanding of the unitary executive theory is that it applies, at 
most, only to state administration of federally-defined law, not to 
state administration of state laws designed to serve federal regulatory 
objectives.”318 If state enforcement of state laws enacted to comply 
 
 317. Id. 
 318. Caminker, supra note 6, at 1078; cf. Krent, supra note 12, at 83–84 (suggesting that 
cooperative-federalism programs violate the separation of powers by exporting enforcement of 
federal law outside the executive branch). 
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with federal cooperative-federalism statutes does not really constitute 
state enforcement of federal law, then no separation-of-powers 
problem arises. As Dean Caminker states, “One can certainly 
imagine a construction of Article II unity according to which the 
President’s supervisory duties extend only to federal law execution by 
subordinate federal officers.”319 
As Dean Caminker notes, if formalist reasoning creates the 
problem of insufficient presidential oversight over cooperative-
federalism programs, “the same formalist reasoning suggests that 
state creation or implementation of what is formally state law—even 
if designed to further federal objectives—lies outside of Article II 
supervisory jurisdiction.”320 He also argues that it would be anomalous 
for the executive branch to superintend discretionary state decisions 
embedded within state-enacted programs that meet federal standards: 
“The unitary executive extends to the reach of what is technically 
federal law, and not beyond to state laws even if intentionally tailored 
to meet federal objectives.”321 
But one can question whether this is truly a formalist, rather than 
a functionalist, argument. The traditional rationales for cooperative 
federalism—efficiency,322 the benefit of local expertise,323 and the 
like—speak in functionalist, not formalist, terms. Moreover, to say 
 
 319. Caminker, supra note 12, at 226. 
 320. Caminker, supra note 6, at 1102. 
 321. Id. at 1103. 
 322. See Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 258 (2002) 
(“Modern efforts to create more efficient regulation recognize the importance of that local 
involvement. They seek a kind of cooperative federalism that would, for example, have federal 
officials make expertise available to state and local officials while seeking to separate expert and 
fact-related matters from more locally based questions of value.”). 
 323. See P.R. Tel. Co. v. Telecomm. Regulatory Bd., 189 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 1999) (“The 
[Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.),] exemplifies a cooperative federalism system, in which state 
commissions can exercise their expertise about the needs of the local market and local 
consumers, but are guided by the provisions of the Act and by the concomitant FCC 
regulations . . . .”); see also Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Forced Federalism: States as 
Laboratories of Immigration Reform, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1673, 1685 (2011) (“In theory, states 
working under an agreement with [Immigration and Customs Enforcement] should be able to 
serve federally defined goals while developing unique enforcement techniques based on local 
expertise.”); Amy Widman, Advancing Federalism Concerns in Administrative Law Through a 
Revitalization of Enforcement Powers: A Case Study of the Consumer Product Safety and 
Improvement Act of 2008, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 165, 177–78 (2010) (“The cooperation 
often consisted of parallel state administrative regimes with local expertise working under the 
auspices of the federal agency. The state regimes would issue permits, investigate violations, and 
issue sanctions, but with varying degrees of federal oversight.”). 
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that states are merely enforcing state law ignores the fact that states 
are enforcing state law in the heavy shadow of comprehensive federal 
oversight. Examples include the mandatory adoption of standards 
according to the federal floor, which changes and evolves over time; 
the submission of an SIP to the federal agency overseeing the 
program; the requirement that states administer their state laws to the 
satisfaction of federal auditors to receive comprehensive federal 
funding; and the displacement of a state’s enforcement efforts 
through either an ad hoc approach, such as overfiling, or a plenary 
one, such as withdrawal of a state’s primacy status.324 
State enforcement in the context of cooperative-federalism 
programs also functions in a radically different way from state 
enforcement of genuinely local state law. First, a state with primacy 
status cannot simply choose not to enforce its parallel state law.325 
Instead, the state government has a mandatory legal duty to enforce 
federally inspired state law. Second, the federal government does not 
generally fund state enforcement of truly local state law.326 Third, and 
finally, the federal government does not generally audit or purport to 
superintend state-government enforcement efforts to enforce local 
laws unrelated to cooperative-federalism programs, much less reserve 
a concurrent enforcement power over a state’s enforcement of its 
local state laws, as it does through the practice of overfiling.327 
 
 324. See RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 4, at 13–21, 91–124 (discussing the 
federal regulatory infrastructure and the enforcement relationship between the EPA and the 
states); Robertson, supra note 202, at 595–96, 600, 606 (discussing federalism’s role in 
environmental protection using the EPA’s ability to overfile as an example). 
 325. See Zahren, supra note 208, at 380–82 (noting that states have a legally binding duty to 
enforce their local laws after achieving plan-state or primacy status). 
 326. See Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 2323, 2328, 2330 (2010) (applying the 
Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006), to block adjudication of a challenge to a state tax in 
federal court because of the states’ critical need for revenue to maintain their government 
operations); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 112 (1981) 
(applying the Tax Injunction Act to protect state revenue collection and noting that “a proper 
respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a 
Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National 
Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their 
separate functions in separate ways” support federal court abstention in such cases (quoting 
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44–45 (1971))); Dows v. City of Chicago, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 108, 
110 (1871) (“It is upon taxation that the several States chiefly rely to obtain the means to carry 
on their respective governments, and it is of the utmost importance to all of them that the 
modes adopted to enforce the taxes levied should be interfered with as little as possible.”). 
 327. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) (noting the “principle that [federal 
courts] will not review judgments of state courts that rest on adequate and independent state 
grounds”). 
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In other words, state enforcement in the context of cooperative-
federalism schemes is radically different from state enforcement of 
ordinary state laws, a context in which the federal government almost 
never plays any significant supervisory role and has no powers to 
displace state-government decisionmakers. Even Dean Caminker, a 
legal scholar who generally rejects the broadest potential applications 
of the unitary-executive theory for cooperative-federalism programs, 
concedes that “there is something intuitively plausible about the 
claim” that administration of state-enacted law in cooperative-
federalism programs is really federal law, because “even though these 
activities technically generate state and not federal law, they 
nevertheless enjoy a sufficiently ‘quasi-federal’ status so as to trigger 
presidential supervision.”328 In consequence, Dean Caminker deems 
the claim “sufficiently plausible to deserve the focused attention of 
unitarians.”329 
Dean Krent argues that cooperative-federalism programs involve 
state enforcement of federal law.330 And Dean Krent is not alone in 
taking this position—Professor Hills also embraces this view: “[N]on-
federal governments serve as agencies of the federal government by 
enforcing federal law with administrative actions and by promulgating 
regulations to fill the gaps in federal statutes.”331 Professor Hills also 
notes that “it is common for federal executive officials to exercise 
only minimal oversight of such non-federal execution of federal 
law.”332 He characterizes cooperative federalism as, “[i]n effect, state 
and local governments serv[ing] as a kind of ‘fourth branch’ of the 
federal government, even more so than so-called independent federal 
regulatory agencies.”333 Finally, even Dean Caminker concedes that 
“[a]s a formal matter, unitary executive theory seems to call for 
presidential supervision of all state execution of ‘sources of federal 
law’ as conventionally understood.”334 
 
 328. Caminker, supra note 6, at 1104–05. 
 329. Id. at 1105. 
 330. See Krent, supra note 3, at 2440 (“Congress long has delegated to state as well as 
private entities. . . . Congress has authorized state officials to enforce a wide range of federal 
laws . . . .”); Krent, supra note 12, at 96 (“[C]ongressional delegations to states under the [Social 
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301–1397mm (2006 & Supp. IV 2010),] and Clean Air Act[] reflect a 
cooperative partnership . . . .”). 
 331. Hills, supra note 145, at 182. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Caminker, supra note 6, at 1102. 
KROTOSZYNSKI IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2012  10:33 PM 
2012] THE NEW FORMALISM 1663 
In sum, although a colorable argument exists that states 
participating in cooperative-federalism programs are merely 
enforcing state law, the better argument seems to be that when states 
act as agents of the federal government, they are administering 
federal law. The alternative approach would, in fact, authorize 
Congress to cannibalize federal executive authority by simply asking 
states to administer federal functions, such as defense, foreign 
relations, immigration, or the enforcement of federal criminal laws, 
on a voluntary basis. The use of voluntary cooperative-federalism 
programs could, in effect, deny the president any meaningful role in 
the day-to-day operation of core executive duties. If such programs 
do not violate the separation of powers, it must be because the means 
of supervision and control provided by statute, or implied as 
constitutional requirements, satisfy the requirements of Article II. 
B. Adequate Mechanisms of Presidential Oversight Exist To Satisfy 
Separation-of-Powers Concerns 
Another response to a separation-of-powers attack on 
cooperative-federalism programs is to assert that existing forms of 
presidential oversight of state enforcement of federal law satisfy 
Article II. State enforcement of federal law takes place only if the 
relevant federal agency first approves the state’s proposed 
enforcement plan and grants the state’s request for primacy status.335 
If a state systematically fails to meet its commitments, the federal 
agency has the option of withdrawing the state’s primacy status or, 
under some statutes, simply overfiling the state’s enforcement action 
and creating a duplicative federal proceeding.336 In addition, the 
federal government funds much of the state’s enforcement activity 
through conditional grants; the federal government can condition 
future funding of state agencies on adequate prior execution of the 
state’s enforcement plan.337 State programs are also subject to federal 
 
 335. See supra notes 158–70 and accompanying text. 
 336. See supra notes 209–21 and accompanying text. 
 337. See David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A 
Functional Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 TEX. L. 
REV. 1197, 1267 (2004) (“[S]ome of the more important conditional preemption programs 
within the American system of cooperative federalism provide federal funds to states in return 
for implementation and administration of a state-level plan.”); Richard B. Stewart, Federalism 
and Rights, 19 GA. L. REV. 917, 957 (1985) (“Cooperative federalism creatively blends the[] 
powers [of state and national governments], using the federal fisc to harness state and local 
capacities to national objectives while allowing for a measure of decentralized flexibility in 
implementation.”); see also Weiser, supra note 13, at 679 (“[T]he United States Supreme Court 
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audits and inspections.338 In sum, multiple and important forms of 
federal oversight of state enforcement of federal law exist.339 
The Supreme Court, were it so inclined, could hold that these 
forms of indirect oversight and ultimate control sufficiently placate 
any lingering separation-of-powers concerns. Indeed, it seems very 
likely that at least four members of the current Supreme Court—the 
Justices dissenting in Free Enterprise Fund—would so hold. There 
are, in fact, strong functionalist arguments to support both this 
analysis and this outcome. 
For example, Dean Krent advances quite plausible functionalist 
arguments that these forms of indirect control, coupled with the 
accountability of state governments to their state citizens, should be 
sufficient to protect cooperative-federalism programs from 
invalidation post-Free Enterprise Fund.340 He notes, first, that “[s]ome 
delegations to state entities facilitate efficient implementation of the 
laws;”341 second, that historical precedents exist for seeking state 
assistance in enforcing federal law, such as the Fugitive Slave Act;342 
and, third, that “[i]n contrast to private entities, state officials are 
politically accountable” and “remain subject to the checks and 
balances in the respective states.”343 Dean Krent also notes that 
 
has at least twice concluded that state receipt of a federal grant requires the state to comply with 
the conditions of the grant, even where they conflict with state law.”); Zahren, supra note 208, 
at 417–18 (“The ‘carrot’ to induce the states to participate in the delegated programs [in 
cooperative federalism] is federal aid and some flexibility in developing and implementing state 
programs. The ‘stick’ is the threat of withdrawal of the entire program itself.”).  
 338. See, e.g., Robert F. Rich, Cinthia L. Deye & Elizabeth Mazur, The State Children’s 
Health Insurance Program: An Administrative Experiment in Federalism, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 
107, 115–16 (noting that “[t]here are also yearly audits of the program and specific reporting 
requirements” in the context of federal support for state children’s health-insurance programs); 
Zahren, supra note 208, at 407–11, 424–25 (discussing federal audit and inspection programs in 
the environmental-law context). 
 339. See, e.g., Andreen, supra note 4, at 259 (discussing EPA controls over state agencies 
enforcing federal environmental statutes). 
 340. See Krent, supra note 3, at 2440–46 (arguing that federal delegations to state entities 
are less problematic under the reasoning of Free Enterprise Fund than delegations to private 
entities because “the Constitution anticipates congressional sharing of power with state far more 
than private entities”; because “state officials are more accountable to the electorate—whether 
directly or indirectly—than are private entities”; and because “there is far less danger of 
congressional aggrandizement in the context of delegation to state entities”). 
 341. Id. at 2442. 
 342. Fugitive Slave Act, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 302, 302 (1793).  
 343. Krent, supra note 3, at 2442, 2445. 
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delegations to the states, although perhaps encroaching on the federal 
executive branch, do not directly aggrandize Congress.344 
These are all credible arguments, but they sound almost entirely 
in functionalist terms. The Free Enterprise Fund majority—and the 
conservatives on the Supreme Court more generally—have 
consistently eschewed functionalist analysis in favor of more 
categorical, formalist analysis in cases raising separation-of-powers 
issues.345 From a formalist perspective, the real question is whether 
the president has sufficient direct control and oversight to conclude 
that executive power remains vested in the federal executive branch 
and that presidential “faithful execution” remains possible. Thus, 
“[t]he broader implications of [Free Enterprise Fund] . . . ultimately 
may rest with constricted opportunities for Congress to delegate 
authority to state and private entities.”346 
A potential formalist cure for the problem of insufficient 
presidential control would be for Congress to require states to give 
the president some measure of direct control over state officers 
enforcing federal laws. Alternatively, the president could unilaterally 
assert such authority directly under the Constitution. But could a 
state government, consistent with its own state constitution, vest the 
supervision, much less removal, of a state officer in a federal officer? 
Professors Calabresi and Prakash strongly embrace this solution, 
claiming that the president must enjoy supervisory powers over state 
officials when state officials implement federal law347: “[T]he 
President could direct state officers in their execution of federal law 
or extract their federal authority from them” because “when these 
state officers execute federal law, they act on behalf of the President, 
the federal Chief Executive.”348 These principles are consistent with 
the professors’ more general claim that “[b]ecause the President 
alone has the constitutional power to execute federal law, it would 
seem to follow that, notwithstanding the text of any given statute, the 
President must be able to execute that statute, interpreting and 
applying it in concrete circumstances.”349 
 
 344. Id. at 2446. 
 345. For a discussion of Supreme Court cases that reflect a strong renewed commitment to 
formalism with respect to the separation of powers, see supra Part II.  
 346. Krent, supra note 3, at 2454. 
 347. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 10, at 639–42. 
 348. Id. at 639. 
 349. Id. at 595. 
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From this vantage point, it necessarily follows that “since the 
President may remove purely federal officers who fail to carry out 
their duties, the President may also ‘remove’ state officers who fail to 
perform their duties adequately.”350 When state officers implement 
federal law, “[t]here is no difference” in the president’s direct powers 
of supervision and control,351 notwithstanding the federalism issues 
that arise when the federal government exercises a power of plenary 
control over state officers who volunteer to enforce federal regulatory 
programs.352 Thus, for Professors Calabresi and Prakash, no 
constitutionally permissible alternative exists to direct presidential 
control over the implementation of federal law.353 
By contrast, Dean Caminker views it as virtually unthinkable 
that the president could direct, much less fire, state officers who 
implement federal law: “While the President may, under the robust 
conception [of the unitary executive], remove from their posts all 
federal executive officials, principles of federalism preclude the 
President from similarly removing from their posts state officials 
administering federal law.”354 In other words, even if Congress created 
statutory forms of presidential control over cooperative-federalism 
programs, and state governments voluntarily acceded to these 
controls, the controls themselves would be invalid based on core 
federalism principles.355 This is so because, “as a practical matter, 
presidential supervision of state officials cannot realistically secure 
the values of centralized authority that drive the [unitary-executive] 
theory.”356 
In some ways, creating comprehensive executive supervisory 
powers over state officers who enforce federal law is the inverse of 
 
 350. Id. at 639 (footnote omitted). 
 351. Id. 
 352. See id. at 639–40 (dismissing Professors Lessig and Sunstein’s conclusion that the 
president does not have the power to remove state executives as question-begging (citing Lessig 
& Sunstein, supra note 278, at 19, 31, 69)); see also Caminker, supra note 6, at 1082–87, 1091–98 
(“The application of the unitary executive theory to state administration of federal law has 
significant, if contested, implications for American federalism . . . .”).  
 353. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 10, at 664 (“As the Framers, ratifiers, ratification 
opponents, members of the First Congress, and President Washington understood, the 
Constitution grants the President the authority to superintend the administration of federal law. 
There are no caveats. There are no exceptions.” (footnote omitted)). 
 354. Caminker, supra note 6, at 1091 (footnote omitted). 
 355. See id. at 1096 (noting that presidential control over state officials “might 
involve . . . frequent or continuous supervision disrupting the daily operations of the state” and 
thus might “blur the lines of political accountability between federal and state officials”). 
 356. Id. at 1078. 
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the problem presented in McCulloch v. Maryland.357 In that case, 
Maryland attempted to regulate an agent of the United States.358 
Chief Justice John Marshall rejected this attempt, explaining that it 
was not feasible for a part to enjoy the ability to regulate and control 
an agent of the whole.359 But the opposite proposition should also 
hold true: The whole, or national government, should not be entitled 
to control the government of the part. Because of the Supremacy 
Clause,360 the federal government has the power to displace state law 
through the exercise of its enumerated powers,361 but there is a world 
of difference between directly displacing state law with federal law 
and attempting to mask federal law as state law.362 
When a federal executive officer exercises supervisory control 
over a state officer, the whole attempts to control the agent of the 
part. But state agents derive their authority from the part, rather than 
from the whole. In a federal system that maintains dual sovereigns, 
the notion of a federal officer’s enjoying power to remove a state 
official seems deeply problematic, perhaps even unthinkable.363 
 
 357. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 358. See id. at 319–22 (describing the Maryland tax scheme and reprinting the Maryland 
statute that purported to tax notes issued by the Bank of the United States); see also id. at 377, 
398 (argument of William Pinkney) (“Congress exercises the power of the people. The whole 
acts on the whole. But the state tax is a part acting on the whole.”). 
 359. Id. at 435–36 (majority opinion) (“[T]he difference is that which always exists, and 
always must exist, between the action of the whole on a part, and the action of a part on the 
whole . . . .”). 
 360. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 361. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 405–06 ( “If any one proposition could command 
the universal assent of mankind, we might expect it would be this—that the government of the 
Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action. . . . The government 
of the United States, then, though limited in its powers, is supreme; and its laws, when made in 
pursuance of the constitution, form the supreme law of the land, ‘any thing in the constitution or 
laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2)); see 
also Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) (“A fundamental principle 
of the Constitution is that Congress has the power to preempt state law.”). For a comprehensive 
overview of the Supremacy Clause’s history and meaning, and the relevant Supreme Court case 
law applying it, see generally Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225 (2000). 
 362. But cf. Siegel, supra note 13, at 1633–35, 1681–83 (arguing that the commandeering of 
state executive officials can sometimes be less offensive to core federalism principles than the 
direct displacement of state law via preemption). 
 363. Cf. Caminker, supra note 6, at 1078, 1091–94 (“According to Calabresi and Prakash, 
the President enjoys a hierarchical relationship to state executives implementing federal law 
that is analogous to the Supreme Court’s supervisory authority over state courts adjudicating 
federal claims. This vision of President-State relations represents a radical departure from the 
conventional view today.” (footnote omitted) (citing Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 10, at 
640)). 
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Moreover, serious practical problems related to government 
accountability also would exist: “If the President is legally responsible 
for supervising state officials’ execution of federal law, and yet 
practical constraints render this authority largely illusory, the 
President might be held responsible by the populace for state 
administrative decisions over which he has no true control.”364 
In sum, creating stronger and more direct forms of executive 
oversight of state officers who administer federal law would create 
new constitutional problems grounded in federalism, even as it 
resolved others grounded in the separation of powers. The Supreme 
Court, accordingly, would have to choose from among the options of 
accepting the attenuated forms of executive oversight that presently 
exist as sufficient to satisfy the separation of powers, compromising 
core federalism principles to create more direct forms of day-to-day 
control, or simply invalidating longstanding cooperative-federalism 
programs. 
C. The Supreme Court Does Not Really Mean What It Seems To Say 
The Supreme Court is not required to follow the implications of 
its decisions to their logical conclusions. Accordingly, Free Enterprise 
Fund could prove to have no greater impact on the constitutional 
status of cooperative-federalism programs than did Printz. Perhaps 
the imperatives of presidential oversight and control do not extend to 
state or private enforcement of federal law. But as Professor Hills 
notes, “[I]t only has been in the last half-century that the Court has 
accepted the notion that the states can play a significant role in 
carrying out federal law.”365 Moreover, according to Professor Hills, 
“it is fair to say that the Court has not fully explored the implications 
of cooperative federalism for the rest of its constitutional 
jurisprudence.”366 
In consequence, at least for the present, it is impossible to know 
whether the Roberts Court has a comprehensive commitment to 
securing presidential oversight of the administration of federal law 
when such administration occurs outside the executive branch of the 
federal government. If it does not, it is possible that the Supreme 
Court will embrace functionalist arguments to sustain cooperative-
federalism programs or simply pretend that the problem does not 
 
 364. Id. at 1097. 
 365. Hills, supra note 145, at 183. 
 366. Id. 
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exist. The Supreme Court could avoid the hard constitutional 
question through recourse to the potential solutions described 
earlier367 or through the simple expedient of never asking the 
question. 
CONCLUSION 
Free Enterprise Fund and the Roberts Court’s embrace of new 
formalism more generally suggest that reconsidering the 
constitutional foundations of cooperative federalism—and 
particularly the separation-of-powers issue that arises from state 
enforcement of federal law—should be a priority for administrative-
law and constitutional-law scholars, as well as for federal judges. To 
be clear, I do not claim that Free Enterprise Fund squarely disallows 
cooperative-federalism programs; my claim is more limited. In my 
view, the majority opinion, along with its formalist cousins, raises 
important questions about the need for sufficiently direct forms of 
presidential oversight and control over state-government 
implementation of federal administrative programs. 
Important questions exist, but remain unanswered, regarding the 
constitutional status of cooperative-federalism programs. As 
Professor Hills observes, “Non-federal implementation of federal law 
has slipped into American constitutional practice with relatively little 
theoretical explanation or justification.”368 Article II’s Vesting and 
Take Care Clauses create an imperative for meaningful presidential 
oversight over the implementation of federal law, yet whether 
cooperative-federalism structures provide sufficient presidential 
oversight to overcome potential separation-of-powers objections very 
much remains an open question. If Free Enterprise Fund means what 
it expressly says, however, cooperative-federalism programs violate 
the separation-of-powers doctrine by unconstitutionally exporting the 
execution of federal law to state-government officers. 
 
 
 367. See supra notes 41–42, 318–64 and accompanying text.  
 368. Hills, supra note 145, at 183. 
